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In the mid-1980s, customers threatened to bypass local gas distribution
companies in favor of other suppliers and cheaper fuels. In response, states
began to reform their natural gas regulatory policies to lower delivered prices
to potential bypassers. In this Article, Professor Kelly argues that the most
promising means of reform is to unbundle traditional local gas utility services,
that is, to make gas transportation services available to customers separately
from gas retail sales services. This Article provides a thorough analysis of the
unbundling policies adopted by state regulators across the nation. Through this
systematic review of intrastate regulatory policies, Professor Kelly outlines the
best method of maintaining open access to markets, of retaining sufficient
regulatory control over local utility companies, and of maximizing competition
and minimizing the adverse effects of cost-shifting and stranded investment.
Professor Kelly asserts that regulatory bodies must recognize the competitive
character of unbundled gas retailing service and the monopolistic nature of
both unbundled gas transportation services and the services that remain
bundled, in order to promote most effectively the primary goal of unbundling:
prevention of uneconomic bypass by providing market-priced natural gas to
end users.
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Finding Order in the Chaos
"Unpredictability was only the attention-grabber. Those studying
chaotic dynamics discovered that the disorderly behavior of simple
systems acted as a creative process.
Introduction
A revolution is transforming natural gas regulation in the fifty states. Prior
to 1984, all was quiet and traditional in this field of regulation.' The states
predictably exercised their jurisdiction over intrastate gas pipelines and local
distribution companies (LDCs). The business of buying, transporting and
reselling gas was bundled up in the LDC3 and governed by classical cost-of-
service ratemaking,4 entry and exit control, and production-related regulation.
Then, bypass commenced and large, long-time gas users threatened to leave the
gas system to use a cheaper alternative fuel such as oil.5 This jolted regulators
into awareness that the natural gas industry faced substantial difficulties.6
Regulators began to experiment with alternative forms of regulation designed
to eliminate the threat of bypass by lowering the delivered price of gas. These
experiments continue today.
1. JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 43 (1987).
2. New York was the the first state to reform its regulation of local distribution by requiring utilities
to carry gas owned by others in certain circumstances. See Opinion and Order Requiring the Filing of
Transportation Tariffs, No. 28,672 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Apr. 24, 1984).
3. See Robert C. Means & Robert S. Angyal, The Regulation and Future Role of Direct Producer Sales,
5 ENERGY L.J. 1, 1 (1984) (explaining that unbundled direct sales between producers and end users rarely
occurred in the intrastate market).
4. Cost-of-service ratemaking is routinely used by governments to regulate prices and profits of
businesses. For a detailed description of this traditional form of regulation, see STEPHEN BREYER, REGULA-
TION AND ITS REFORM 36-59 (1982).
5. Bypass occurs when customers leave the LDCs' distribution system and turn to another distribution
system to obtain fuel. A customer might purchase natural gas from another pipeline, or they might switch
to an alternative fuel. Initially, the most common form of bypass involved customers switching to alternative
fuels. In the mid-1980s, however, a change in federal regulatory policy made it easier for gas end users
to switch from an LDC's distribution system to an interstate natural gas distribution system. For this reason,
the opportunities for bypass have broadened. See discussion infra note 25.
6. Commentators had recognized that the pre- 1984 changes in gas price regulation, discussed infra Part
I(A), would cause market anomalies, including uneconomic bypass, unless concurrent regulatory reform
of interstate and intrastate pipelines and LDCs was undertaken. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconsider-
ing the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural Gas Industry, 97 HARv. L. REV. 345 (1983);
Harry G. Broadman, Regulatory Reform of Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author); Paul R. Carpenter et al., Natural Gas Pipeline Regulation after Field Price Decontrol
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); House Republican Research Comm. Task Force on Energy
and Natural Resources, Contract Carriage: Competition in the Natural Gas Market (July 15, 1983) Ihereinaf-
ter Task Force Report].
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Bypass of local gas distribution systems occurs, in part, because many large
gas consumers are able to bum oil as well as gas 7 In the early 1980s, the
delivered price of gas began to increase relative to that of oil. Large gas users
threatened to switch to oil unless their gas prices were lowered. If these con-
sumers bypassed the natural gas transportation and distribution system, the cost
of maintaining the system would fall to the small, captive customers. Faced
with the prospect of raising rates to these customers, regulators had an incentive
to find ways to lower the delivered cost of gas to potential bypassers. They
were supported in this quest by many gas producers who had been shut out of
existing markets and were clamoring to sell their gas, even at lower than
prevailing prices.
In the late 1970s, gas producers across the country increased production
capacity in response to the higher wellhead prices of the Natural Gas Policy
Act of 1978 (NGPA). However, these higher prices had a classic, predictable
effect on consumers: they steadily scaled back gas consumption from a 1979
maximum. By 1984, many gas producers with excess production capacity were
willing to sell directly to consumers at prices lower than those allowed by
regulations. Federal deregulation of wellhead prices under the NGPA led to
competition among gas producers and encouraged direct bargaining between
producers and consumers.9 Regulators quickly saw that the easiest way to
lower gas costs to potential bypassers was simply to let willing producers sell
cheaper gas. However, direct retailing of natural gas to customers by a seller
other than a pipeline was a significant break from tradition. Change can be
difficult in any industry, but it is particularly so in one guarded by entrenched
economic regulation. Over the last seven years, state administrative agencies
have gingerly, but increasingly, required gas utilities under their jurisdiction
to provide gas transportation service to customers who want to buy gas from
other vendors. This unbundling of gas and transportation, two services tradition-
ally offered only as one package by local gas utilities, established competition
in the merchandising of gas. This is a momentous change for the natural gas
industry; it demands an equally momentous change in intrastate regulation of
the industry.
7. The bypass phenomenon and its causes are discussed in more detail infra Part I(A).
8. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3312 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1988)). The Natural Gas
Policy Act provides for the phased deregulation of wellhead prices of much gas produced in the interstate
market and all gas produced in the intrastate market from wells drilled after October 1978. In 1989,
Congress passed the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act, which will end all remaining federal price
controls by January 1, 1993. See Pub. L. No. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3331 (Supp.
1989)).
9. Robert Hahn and John Hird summarize studies estimating the cost of natural gas price regulation.
They estimate the efficiency benefits of price deregulation to be $5.0 billion. See Robert W. Hahn & John
A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 233, 265-67
(1990); see also Pierce, supra note 6, at 352, 371-72 (estimating net annual loss in social welfare of $2.5
to 5.0 billion as a result of governmental regulation of wellhead gas prices).
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So far, there is no model policy prototype for intrastate regulatory reform
to implement unbundling. I0 Most states are experimenting with new regulatory
regimes on a case-by-case basis; only fifteen states have developed comprehen-
sive policies. The lack of consistency even among these policies, plus the
absence of any lexicon for comparing similarities and contrasting differences,
have hindered discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of innovative
intrastate regulatory reforms. This Article offers several models that can be used
to foster dialogue and to develop more widely used methods of regulating, or
not regulating, unbundled gas and transportation services.
Review of the various state approaches to rebundling regulation shows that
much of the lack of clarity and consistency is due to a failure to reflect the
distinct theoretical foundations of monopoly and nonmonopoly regulation. For
example, intrastate distribution of natural gas remains a monopoly in most
places in the U.S." I and, thus, rate regulation remains appropriate. In contrast,
the sale of gas is subject to competition and is already a competitive business
in some end use sectors. For this nonmonopoly service, 2 classical cost-of-
service, entry and exit, and production regulation is not appropriate. Failure to
recognize these distinctions results in both overregulation and underregulation
that thwart the original goal of the regulators-to lower delivered gas prices
to potential bypassers. Another regulatory precept holds that achieving lower
prices for potential bypassers will shift costs to other customer classes if prices
previously included a subsidy paid by the bypassers. Failure to appreciate this
principle has resulted in new complicated regulatory programs that are designed
10. Richard Pierce has identified and analyzed policy options for state agencies. See RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR., COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC REGULATION, REGULATION AND COMPETITION IN NATURAL GAS
DISTRIBUTION (1990) [hereinafter CER REPORT]. Other commentators have also provided some principles
of regulatory reform for interstate pipelines and discussed their possible applicability to LDCs. See Robert
C. Means & Deborah A. Cohn, Common Carriage of Natural Gas, 59 TUL. L. REV. 529, 532 (1985).
11. See Harry G. Broadman & Joseph P. Kalt, How Natural Is Monopoly? The Case of Bypass in
Natural Gas Distribution Markets, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 197 (1989). But see discussion infra note 71.
12. In adopting its final order eliminating the vintage pricing of gas, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) noted that both Congress and the courts have recognized the competitive nature of
this market. FERC Order No. 451, 51 Fed. Reg. 22,171, 22,171 at n.28 (1986). See Natural Gas Policy Act,
Title 1, 15 U.S.C. § 3301; see also Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360, 378-89 (5th ir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1968) ("Producers
of natural gas cannot usefully be classed as public utilities.... They are intensely competitive vendors of
a wasting commodity they have acquired only by costly and often unrewarded search."). Recently, several
commentators have analyzed the degree of competitiveness of today's wholesale gas market. See MOHAM-
MAD HARUNUZZAMAN ET AL, REGULATION FOR LOCAL GAS DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES UNDER CHANGING
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 38-44 (1991). They conclude that "[olne can reasonably contend that the market for
short-term spot contracts is workably competitive while market dominance for contracts for peak-load gas
may exist. It may be true that pipelines do dominate the market for peak-load contract gas. This dominance,
however .... may be regulatory-induced rather than reflecting the exercise of market power." Id. at 40.
Although the nature of this non-monopoly market does not demand utility-like rate regulation, regulation
may nevertheless be necessary to prevent anticompetitive abuse.
Additional federal regulatory reform of interstate pipelines could eliminate much of the potential for
anticompetitive conduct. See, e.g., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Pipeline Service Obligations
and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-Inplementing Transportation, 56 Fed. Reg. 38,372 (1991)
(FERC); see also HARUNUZZAMAN ET AL., at 42-43.
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to prevent cost-shifting, but that prove inefficacious and counterproductive to
the original goal.
This Article evaluates issues confronted by states in choosing whether and
how to reform regulation of local gas companies. Part I explains why reform
occurred and prescribes intrastate unbundling to transform the gas industry and
its regulation. It also outlines the regulatory experimentation that has ensued
in the states. Part II proposes that post-unbundling regulation of the LDC as
independent gas retailer be formulated separately from regulation of the LDC
as gas transporter and discusses three models that may be used to regulate the
LDC as independent gas retailer. In addition, it describes various state
approaches to regulation of unbundled transportation service and offers two
models to explain how transportation rate regulation has evolved. Part III
specifies the most effective approaches to intrastate regulatory reform, conclud-
ing with concrete recommendations.
I. Unbundling Intrastate Natural Gas Utility Services
A. The Impetus to Change Local Gas Utility Service and its Regulation
In the mid-1980s the threat of what came to be called "uneconomic bypass"
prompted state regulators to reform traditional natural gas utility service 3 and
its regulation. 4 At the gas distribution level, 15 bypass occurs when customers
of the LDC turn to another gas provider such as an interstate, intrastate, or
private pipeline; or start using a fuel other than gas, including coal, electricity,
fuel oil, or wood; or invest in conservation measures to consume less gas.
Significant bypass by long-standing customers causes severe financial problems
for the LDCs. The LDCs will be saddled with the fixed costs previously borne
by the bypassers and any new costs occasioned by their departure, such as take-
13. Students of regulation were not surprised by the bypass phenomenon because the regulation of
natural gas has long been inconsistent with the theory of regulation. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconstituting
the Natural Gas Industry from Wellhead to Burnertip, 9 ENERGY L.J. 1, 1-2 (1988) [hereinafter Pierce,
Reconstituting the Industryl; Harry G. Broadman, Natural Gas Deregulation: A Stud'y of Recurring
Regulatory Reform 2-3 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Broadman, Natural Gas];
MICHAEL TOMAN, RATE DESIGN AND OTHER REGULATORY REFORMS IN LOCAL NATURAL GAS MARKETS
8 (1986); see also supra note 6. Most regulators were not aware of the theoretical problems with natural
gas regulation, but they knew an unfavorable result when they saw it; bypass was the attention-grabber.
While some regulators were aware that current regulation was inappropriate, they needed the more concrete
threat of bypass to justify changing the regulatory status quo.
14. State regulators were also affected by federal regulatory reform. See, e.g., Charles G. Stalon &
Reinier H.J.H. Lock, State-Federal Relations in the Economic Regulation of Energy, 7 YALE J. ON REG.
427, 427-28 (1990); Paul R. Carpenter et al., Adapting to Change in Natural Gas Markets, in ENERGY:
MARKETS AND REGULATION, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF M.A. ADELMAN 24 (Richard L. Gordon et al. eds.,
1987); Suedeen G. Kelly, Regulatory Reform of the U.S. Natural Gas Industry: A Summing Up, 27 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 841, 841 (1987).
15. Bypass of interstate and intrastate pipelines can also occur. For a discussion of bypass in natural
gas transmission, see Paul W. MacAvoy et al., Is Competitive Entry Free? Bypass and Partial Deregulation
in Natural Gas Markets, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 216-21 (1989).
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or-pay liabilities. 6 The gas companies are likely to look to regulators to
require the remaining customers to pick up these costs.
Customers bypass if they can use alternative fuels or conserve at a lower
price or if alternate gas providers can furnish comparable service at a lower
price. The bypass is termed uneconomic if it would not have occurred had the
delivered gas not been priced higher than its cost. In other words, the bypass
would not have occurred if the gas previously provided to the bypasser had
been priced at market price and the transportation of that gas had been priced
at cost. 7
The potential for bypass increased in the period 1980-83 when the price of
oil, an acceptable alternative fuel for many large gas users, 8 decreased relative
to the price of gas. 9 During the mid- and late-1970s, the price of gas was
significantly less than the price of oil, but in 1981 the prices started to con-
verge.2° By 1983, the national average price of 1% sulfur residual fuel oil was
16. Take-or-pay liabilities arise from a typical provision in a contract between an LDC and a gas
producer which obliges the LDC to take a minimum volume of gas from the producer or pay for it anyway.
If the LDC loses customers who have traditionally consumed and paid for this minimum volume of gas,
the LDC must nevertheless pay for the gas not taken. For additional discussion of take-or-pay contracts
and minimum commodity purchase commitments, see infra notes 38 and 76 and accompanying text.
17. This Article makes no attempt to explain to the cost analyst how to conduct cost analysis to arrive
at a cost-based rate. Rather, it attempts to highlight the objectives of post-unbundling regulatory reform that
may affect professional judgment within the cost study. In ratemaking, "cost" may mean, for example,
marginal cost, embedded cost, fully allocated cost, etc. For a discussion of some of the tensions arising from
attempts at pricing in a competitive but regulated environment, see CER REPORT, supra note 10, at 42-51.
Because marginal cost-based rates do not cover the large fixed costs of pipeline monopolies, deviation from
marginal cost pricing (the pricing that would prevail under perfect competition) is necessary to pick up the
common fixed costs and allow the pipeline to earn its revenue requirement. Daniel Z. Czamanski, Price
Discrimination Limits and the Loss of Load by Gas Utilities, in NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING
ISSUES 74-75 (J. Stephen Henderson, ed., 1986). Cost allocation in this context leaves much room for
judgment. Cost allocation is frequently made on usage-based criteria. Regulators differ as to how much
deviation from marginal cost constitutes undue discrimination. From an economic perspective, Czamanski
explains, the revenue recovered from potential bypassers need only recover the costs incurred by the LDC
in excess of the stand-alone costs of the other customers. Id. at 75-83. Thus, any rate discount to potential
bypassers that does not violate this principle would not constitute undue economic discrimination.
18. In 1983 it was estimated that 4 to 6 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of U.S. gas consumption could quite
easily switch to residual fuel oil. See Carl V. Swanson, Business Strategy for Natural Gas Pipelines Caught
in the Middle Between Field and Consumer Markets 2 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Given
1983 natural gas consumption of approximately 17,500 trillions of Btu (17 Tcf), 23% to 35% of total gas
consumption could easily switch to residual fuel oil. See AMERICAN GAS ASS'N, 1984 GAS FACTS 123
(1984).
19. Distillate fuel oil and residual fuel oil compete with natural gas in industrial and utility end-use
markets.
20. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, COMPETITION AND OTHER CURRENT
ISSUES IN THE NATURAL GAS MARKET 76 (1984).
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less than the national average price of gas to industrial customers.2' The stage
was set for fuel switching.22
State regulators saw this scenario unfold. Uneconomic bypass motivated a
number of them23 to adopt regulatory changes designed to counter bypass by
driving the price of gas delivered by their LDCs down to the market price.
Eliminating bypass caused by overpriced natural gas does not prevent all bypass
of the LDC's system. Customers will still leave the system if they can obtain
an alternative fuel
2' at a cheaper price.
2 5
B. A Fitting Solution: Offering Unbundled Utility Services
Regulators of intrastate pipelines and LDCs may use three policies to lower
delivered gas prices to potential bypassers: lowering the total delivered price
to potential bypassers on a case-by-case basis with an antibypass discount;
lowering the transportation charge to bypassing customers through transporta-
tion rate design reform; and/or encouraging provision of market-priced gas to
end users through the unbundling of traditional local gas utility services.
Unbundling provides the most fitting solution.
21. Id. at 69-76. Oil prices fell again in 1986 while many contract gas prices did not, causing
significant fuel switching, as evidenced by gas and oil consumption changes between 1985 and 1986. Utility
consumption of natural gas decreased by 14.5% during this period, and industrial consumption decreased
by 11.4%. During the same time, fuel oil consumption increased by 16.4% and residual fuel oil by 1.3%.
See Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, An Industry in Turmoil: The Remaking of the Natural Gas Industry, 27 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 773, 777 (1987).
22. This development helped motivate the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to experi-
ment with regulatory reform of interstate pipelines. See, e.g., FERC Order No. 234-B, 48 Fed. Reg. 34,872
(1983) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 157 (1983)); FERC Order No. 319, 48 Fed. Reg. 34,875 (1983) (codified
at 18 C.F.R. § 284 (1983)); FERC Order No. 319-A, 48 Fed. Reg. 51,436 (1983) (codified at 18 C.F.R.
§ 284 (1983)) (permitting interstate pipelines to transport gas to large users capable of switching to
alternative fuels). On reviewing these orders, the D.C. Circuit observed, "[tihe Commission saw promise
in [these] arrangements whereby pipelines would simply transport gas sold directly by producers, at prices
competitive with alternative fuels, to end users who might otherwise exit the system." Maryland People's
Counsel v. FERC, 761 F.2d 780, 781-82 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (vacating the FERC orders for failure to consider
the anticompetitive effects of limiting the availability of transportation of direct-sale gas to large users).
23. See discussion infra Part I(C).
24. Oil is the primary alternative fuel for large gas users. Because the market price of oil is similar
to the market price of gas, bypass can be eliminated largely by lowering the price of gas to market levels.
25. They will also leave if they can get gas delivered at a cheaper price by, for example, finding a less
costly delivery system than the LDC's. FERC's present policy of encouraging interstate pipeline competition
by having pipelines expand their facilities through private contracts without putting existing ratepayers at
risk for new investment has increased this type of bypass and spawned much controversy with the states.
See FERC Order No. 436, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408 (1985) (codified at 18 CFR §§ 2, 157, 250, 284, 375 and
381); FERC Order No. 500,52 Fed. Reg. 30,334 (1987) (codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 2 and 284). Federal courts
have approved of, and brought within exclusive federal jurisdiction, FERC's authorization of interstate
pipelines to make direct delivery of gas to customers who would otherwise have their gas delivered by the
local distribution system. For a discussion of these decisions, see William G. Traynor, Judicial Approval
of Bypass Transportation: The MICHCON Cases, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1473 (1990); see also Martin V.
Kirkwood, Comment, Distributor Bypass in the Deregulated Natural Gas Industry-Are Consumers Being
Left in the Cold?, 39 CATH. U.L. REV. 1157 (1990).
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Antibypass discounts will keep potential bypassers on the system, but the
cost of the discount is borne entirely by the other customers on the system or
by the LDC's shareholders, not by the gas retailers, who should bear it. In
addition, antibypass discounts do nothing to address the cause of most LDC
bypass-competition among fuels arising from oil and gas price deregulation.
Transportation rate design reform may result in lower delivered gas prices, but
it alone will not consistently prevent bypass.26 Only unbundling allows LDCs
to retain their customers by causing gas retailers to absorb most, if not all, of
the cost of lowering gas prices. Unbundling enables the market, rather than
regulators, to govern competition among fuels. The states have experimented
with all three of these approaches. Unbundling, however, is the most promising
long-range solution to counter the decreased competitiveness of natural gas in
the energy market.
Some states have authorized utilities on a case-by-case basis to provide a
potential bypasser with an antibypass discount in order to retain the load. For
example, the Wyoming Public Service Commission granted the application of
Cheyenne Light, Fuel & Power Co. to reduce gas rates to an industrial customer
and concomitantly to increase gas rates to Cheyenne Light's remaining custom-
ers." The customer wanted to connect directly to, and be served by, an inter-
state pipeline. The Commission found that if the customer left Cheyenne Light's
system, the increase for each of the utility's customer classes (residential,
commercial, industrial, and special contract), which would be necessary to pick
up the payments for fixed costs previously made by the departing customer,.
would range from 2.06% to 3.04%.28 To avoid this, the Commission raised
rates from between 0.46% to 0.65% to fund the antibypass discount. Other
states have acted similarly.29 While the antibypass discount does. preserve the
LDC's load from bypass, it does not further any structural industry reforms to
eliminate uneconomic bypass.
When regulators reform the LDC's transportation rate design to avoid
bypass, they lower the transportation component of the rate. Previously, many
states allocated a greater amount of common costs to the transportation rates
of large users in order to extend lower rates to other preferred custom-
26. See, e.g., Broadman & Kalt, supra note 11, at 200 (arguing that "inappropriate LDC rate designs
or the inability to provide customers with the services that they demand are the underlying roots of bypass").
27. In re Application of Cheyenne Light, Fuel & Power Co., No. 9511 SUB 84 (Wyo. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, Orders of July 18, 1984 and Aug. 24, 1984).
28. Id. (Order of July 18, 1984) at 2 3. These increases are premised on the Commission's
assumption that the cost of the discount would be borne entirely by the customers.
29. A report on recent cases in Washington, Illinois, and Idaho indicates that not all regulators in these
states have immediately passed on the cost of the discount to remaining customers. See Mary Nagelhout,
"Antibypass'" Discounts: Load Preservation Without Rate Discrimination, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 1, 1991,
at 45, 47-49.
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ers-residential users, for example.30 However, minimizing the allocation of
common costs to the rates of potential bypassers does not lower the delivered
price of gas enough3 to compete with the delivered price of alternative fuels
when the cost of the gas itself is above market rates. Also, like antibypass
discounts, the price discounts available to potential bypassers through transpor-
tation rate design reform must be covered by other customers if the LDC is to
maintain its revenues. As more state regulators now realize, a competitive price
can be achieved only when the gas component of the delivered price equals the
market price and the transportation component is set at cost.
32
Unbundling traditional gas utility services entails offering and pricing
separately the services which traditionally have been offered only as a singly
priced package by pipelines and LDCs. These services, broadly defined, include
the provision of gas and of its transportation. If these services are unbundled,
purchasers are free to buy gas in the market from numerous sellers, presumably
at the market price. Of course, purchasers need not avail themselves of unbun-
dled services. Unbundling as described here and throughout this Article does
not mean that a local utility offers only unbundled services, but rather that it
offers unbundled services in addition to the traditional prepackaged service.
Unbundling appealed to many state regulators in the mid-1980s because they
saw it as solving the problem of providing market priced gas to large users,
thus eliminating the threat of uneconomic bypass.33 Unbundling also promised
to solve two other problems nagging regulators at the time: angry producers
who could not get their gas to market34 and disgruntled captive gas consumers
who were paying higher than market prices for their gas.
In the early 1980s,35 there was an excess supply of gas on the market, and
many producers without contracts could not get interstate pipelines, traditional
30. See Pierce, Reconstituting the Industry, supra note 13, at 49; Coin C. Blaydon, State Policies Under
Pressure, in DRAWING THE LINE ON NATURAL GAS REGULATION 157, 161 (Joseph P. Kalt & Frank C.
Schuller eds. 1987); Czamanski, supra note 17 (discussing economic costs and benefits of various pricing
policies); see also supra note 17 (discussing allocation of common costs).
31. Even if all of the costs incurred by the LDC after the gas reaches the city gate were put in the
transportation component of retail rates, these costs still only amount on average to about 24% of the
delivered price of gas. In 1989, only 23.46% of the average price to the consumer represented costs incurred
after the gas reached the city gate; in 1988, this percentage was 24.79, and in 1987 it was 23.41. See
AMERICAN GAS ASS'N, 1990 GAS FACrS 112 (1990).
32. See discussion supra note 17.
33. In 1985, FERC initiated its "blanket transportation certificate" program which provided incentives
to interstate pipelines to open up access to their transportation services. See supra note 25, FERC Order
No. 436. This order initiated the unbundling of interstate pipeline services. This development gave many
states an additional reason to unbundle at the local level.
34. For a summary of this market problem, see BROADMAN, NATURAL GAS, supra note 13, at 5.
35. The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA), supra note 8, provided high price ceilings for certain
categories of natural gas, and producers responded to these price signals by increasing production. Consum-
ers likewise responded to higher prices for natural gas by decreasing their consumption. Consequently, a
"bubble" of excess deliverability of natural gas appeared. FERC has summarized these and other changes
in the natural gas market between 1978 and 1985. See 50 Fed. Reg. 24,130, 24,132-34 (1985); 50 Fed. Reg.
42,408, 42,412-21 (1985).
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purchasers, to buy gas. 6 Other producers had contracts with pipelines to take
gas, but pipelines, responding to a slack demand, were not taking the gas. In
some instances, pipelines that had take-or-pay contracts37 with producers were
not taking gas or paying for it.3" Thus, producers were seeking to sell gas to
individual large users, even at low spot market prices.39 Some states initiating
regulatory reform saw that unbundling could work to the benefit of these
producers by allowing them to sell directly to consumers wanting lower-priced
gas supplies instead of selling to pipelines. 4° Also, some regulators, realizing
that unbundling enhances the competitiveness of the gas commodity market by
eliminating the pipeline monopsony, hoped that captive consumers would reap
benefits from such a market over time."
C. The Chaos of Resulting Regulatory Reform
Unbundling the sale of gas from its transportation at the local level causes
fundamental changes in the traditional functions and structure of the industry.
The most profound is the injection of competition into the retail gas monopoly.
Once consumers are free to buy gas separately from transportation, they
examine whether a seller other than their LDC can better meet their needs. This
forces the LDC to compete with other retailers to sell a commodity. If an LDC
decides it wants to compete in this market, it must adapt its preexisting gas
procurement activities to the new function. This, in turn, may force it to
restructure its organization to achieve its new objective. Alternatively, the LDC
may decide not to compete in the retailing of gas. 2 Since LDCs have histori-
cally made their profits only on the transportation of gas, not the sale, of it, a
utility may have no interest in developing its competitive gas retailing business.
As long as that LDC can maintain its transportation volumes without participat-
ing in the new competitive gas retailing market, it may have no incentive to
enter. In either event, the regulators of LDCs must determine whether to modify
regulation which has been premised on a monopoly of both the transportation
and retailing of natural gas.
36. See supra note 35, 50 Fed. Reg. 24,130, 24,132-34 (1985); 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408, 42,412-21 (1985).
37. See supra note 16 for a definition of take-or-pay contracts.
38. For a discussion of these issues and the litigation they spawned, see J. Michael Medina, The Take-
Or-Pay Wars: A Further Status Report, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 381 (1988); WILLIAM A. MOGEL & JAMES E.
MANN, NATURAL GAS: CURRENT FEDERAL AND STATE DEVELOPMENTS 23-70 (1987); David L. Roland,
Comment, Take-or-Pay Provisions: Major Problems for the Natural Gas Industry, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 251
(1986).
39. See supra note 35, 50 Fed. Reg. 24,130, 24,132-34 (1985); 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408, 42,412-21 (1985).
40. In re Intrastate Natural Gas Transp. Rates and Serv., 79 P.U.R.4th 224, 229-30 (Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1986).
41. Id. at 228.
42. The Gas Company of New Mexico, a large LDC, has chosen not to operate in the competitive gas
retailing market. Interview with John Ackerman, President of the Gas Company of New Mexico, in Santa
Fe, New Mexico (Apr. 1989).
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Another significant change to the industry resulting from unbundling is the
emergence of new market participants, the independent retailers. Independent
retailers include gas marketing companies, which purchase and pool gas for
resale from a number of producers, and gas brokers who arrange purchases and
sales of gas without taking title to the commodity. Independent retailers may
or may not be affiliated with a pipeline or LDC. They join gas producers,
LDCs, and pipelines in making gas sales directly to consumers. The presence
of these new entities and the new relationships among traditional entities also
require a rethinking of the regulation of the industry; including whether there
should be any regulation of the new natural gas retailers. or the new retail
transactions and, if so, what form this regulation should take.
The states that have unbundled sales and transportation have answered these
questions differently. 3 The resulting regulation in the states is anything but
traditional and predictable. Only fifteen states have adopted comprehensive,
state-wide regulatory policies to govern unbundling in their jurisdictions."
They are California, 5 Colorado,4 6 Iowa,47  Kentucky,48 Maryland,49  Mas-
43. In a 1988 survey conducted by the National Regulatory Research Institute, 35 states and the District
of Columbia reported that they have gas transportation of some sort. ROBERT E. BURNS, DANIEL J. DUANN
& PETER A. NAGLER, STATE GAS TRANSPORTATION POLICIES: AN EVALUATION OF APPROACHES (1989).
44. See Natural Gas Marketing and Transportation Committee: 1990 Annual Report, in NATURAL
RESOURCES, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL' LAW, THE YEAR IN REVIEW: 1990 57, 83-95 (ABA Sec. of
Nat. Resources, Energy, & Envtl. L. 1991).
45. California overhauled its gas transportation and procurement policies and adopted final rules
effective August 1, 1991. See In re Rulemaking on the Structure of Gas Util. Procurement Practices and
Refinements to the Regulatory Framework for Gas Util., 118 P.U.R.4th 1 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1990).
The California Commission announced these rules were temporary and would be reconsidered after FERC
and the California Commission ruled on the issue of capacity brokering. See id. at 1-2, 28, 46. For a
summary of these rules, see Natural Gas Marketing and Transportation Committee: 1990 Annual Report,
supra note 44, at 84-86.
46. Colorado adopted rules requiring intrastate pipelines and LDCs to provide transportation service
in a nonpreferential, nondiscriminatory manner, subject to available capacity. See In re Rules of the Pub.
Util. Comm'n of Colo. Regulating Gas Transp. Serv., No. 90R-508G (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Apr. 17,
1991).
47. The Iowa Utilities Board adopted rules requiring gas distribution utility companies to transport
natural gas owned by others on a nondiscriminatory basis, subject to capacity limitation of the system. In
re Natural Gas Distribution Util.; Obligation to Serve and Transp. Tariffs, No. RMU-86-11 (Iowa Dep't
Comm. Util. Div. Aug. 22, 1986) (codified at 250 IOWA ADMIN. CODE § 19.13 (Suplp. 1989)). For a
summary of these rules, see Natural Gas Marketing and Transportation Committee: 1990 Annual Report,
supra note 44, at 86.
48. In 1984, the Kentucky Legislature authorized the Kentucky Public Service Commission to require
its intrastate pipelines and LDCs to transport gas owned by others. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 278.505-
278.507 (Michie 1989). In a series of orders, the Kentucky Commission ordered each utility operating within
the Commonwealth to offer transportation on a first-come, first-served, nondiscriminatory basis. See In re
An Investigation of the Impact of Fed. Pol. on Natural Gas to Ky. Consumers and Suppliers, No. 297 (Ky.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n May 29, 1987); Order granting Motions and Petitions for Clarification and Rehearing,
July 2, 1987; Order on Rehearing, Oct. 23, 1987. For a summary of these orders, see Natural Gas Marketing
and Transportation Committee: 1990 Annual Report, supra note 44, at 87.
49. The Maryland Public Service Commission has required its four largest LDCs to transport gas owned
by others. In re Interstate Sale and Transp. of Gas, 80 P.U.R.4th I (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986).
Maryland's smaller LDCs are encouraged, but not required, to offer transportation services. Id. For a
summary of Maryland's policies, see Natural Gas Marketing and Transportation Committee: 1990 Annual
Report, supra note 44, at 87-88.
Finding Order in the Chaos
sachusetts, ° Missouri,5 New Mexico,52 New York,53 Ohio, 4 Oregon, 5
Pennsylvania,56  Virginia,57  West Virginia,5" and Wisconsin. 59  Another
50. The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities requires its LDCs to offer firm and interruptible
transportation service. In re Intrastate Natural Gas Transp. Serv., 86 P.U.R.4th 23 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Util.
1987). Massachusetts has a comprehensive policy regarding transportation rates but leaves specificity of
other terms and conditions of transportation open for decision on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 56. For a
summary of this policy, see Natural Gas Marketing and Transportation Committee: 1990 Annual Report,
supra note 44, at 88.
51. The Missouri Public Service Commission has adopted interim guidelines for mandatory trans-
portation services by its LDCs. In re Transp. of Natural Gas, 78 P.U.R.4th 72 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1986). For a summary of these guidelines, see Natural Gas Marketing and Transportation Committee: 1990
Annual Report, supra note 44, at 88-89.
52. New Mexico has legislated the mandatory transportation of natural gas owned by others to the
extent of available capacity and consistent with any conditions imposed by New Mexico's Public Service
Commission to "safeguard deliverability and operational efficiency and to prevent undue hardship and
anticompetitive conduct by a public utility." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-6-4.1 (Michie Supp. 1988). The
Commission has adopted rules to implement the law. Code of Rules and Reg. of the N.M. Pub. Serv. Co-
mm'n § 660 (1990) [hereinafter NMPSC Rules]. For a summary of these rules, see Natural Gas Marketing
and Transportation Committee: 1990 Annual Report, supra note 44, at 89.
53. New York has a statute authorizing its Public Service Commission to order its local gas companies
to transport gas owned by others. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 66-d(2) (McKinney 1989). The Commission
implemented this law, set forth standards governing firm and interruptible transportation, and required almost
all its gas companies to provide transportation services. Motion of the Commission to Determine Whether
and With What Restrictions Transp. of Customer Owned Gas Should Be Authorized, Order 85-6, Case No.
28672 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Apr. 24, 1984) [hereinafter NYPSC Order]. Although the Commission
has not amended its transportation guidelines on a generic basis, it has made changes in subsequent, indi-
vidual cases. See Order re Staff Recommendation of Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. Tariff Filing to Permit
Greater Flexibility to Market Interruptible Serv. (Nov. 18, 1988); Order re Staff Recommendation of
Rochester Gas & Elec. Tariff Filing to Define LDC Supply Obligations to Transp. Customers (Oct. 5, 1990);
Order re Staff Recommendation of Niagara Mohawk Power Co. Revisions to Transp. Serv. (Jan. 31, 1990)
(tightening rules regarding balancing). For a summary of these standards, see Natural Gas Marketing and
Transportation Committee: 1990 Annual Report, supra note 44, at 90-91.
. 54. Ohio permits but does not require its LDCs to transport gas. The Ohio Public Utilities Commission
has adopted guidelines for voluntary transportation arrangements. In re Investigation of the Availability of
Gas Transp. Serv. Provided by Ohio Gas Distribution Util. to End-Use Customers, No. 85-800-GA-COI
(Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n Aug. 1, 1989). The Ohio Commission initially adopted gas transportation program
guidelines on April 15, 1986 and revised them on August 11, 1988, with minor changes made on November
8, 1988 and January 4, 1989. In re Ohio Investigation (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n Apr. 15, 1986); In re Ohio
Investigation (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n Nov. 8, 1988); In re Investigation of the Availability of Gas Transp.
Serv. Provided by Ohio Gas Distribution Util. to End-Use Customers at 1. The Order of April 15, 1986,
explains the rationale behind the Commission's guidelines. For a summary of these guidelines, see Natural
Gas Marketing and Transportation Committee: 1990 Annual Report, supra note 44, at 91-92.
55. The Oregon Commission has a comprehensive policy governing the transportation of gas by its
LDCs. In re Natural Gas Transp. Serv., 101 P.U.R.4th 210 (Or. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1989). For a summary
of this policy, see Natural Gas Marketing and Transportation Committee: 1990 Annual Report, supra note
44, at 92-93.
56. Pennsylvania has comprehensive regulations mandating natural gas transportation by jurisdictional
utilities. 52 PA. CODE §§ 60.1 - 60.9 (1990) (adopted in In re Regulations Governing Intrastate Natural Gas
Transp. Rates and Serv., 79 P.U.R.4th 224 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1986)). For a summary of these
regulations, see Natural Gas Marketing and Transportation Committee: 1990 Annual Report, supra note
44, at 93.
57. The Virginia State Corporation Commission has established policies for voluntary transportation
services, although it has declined to require that its utilities offer transportation services. In re Natural Gas
Indus. Rates and Transp. Policies, 78 P.U.R.4th 57 (Va. St: Corp. Comm'n 1986). For a summary of these
policies, see Natural Gas Marketing and Transportation Committee: 1990 Annual Report, supra note 44,
at 93-94.
58. West Virginia state law authorizes the West Virginia Commission to allow or to require jurisdiction-
al intrastate pipelines and LDCs to transport gas owned by others. W. VA. CODE § 24-3-3a(b) (1986). The
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twenty states have begun experimental unbundling utility-by-utility. ° Even
some of the states with uniform policies have altered them over the few years
they have been in existence.6 These examples indicate that individual policies
and utility unbundling experiments often differ markedly between states.
62
This differentiation is not surprising because regulatory experimentation has
proceeded more or less simultaneously and independently in each of the states.
Historically, there was no model policy for unbundling services of intrastate
facilities, 63 and even today there is no widely accepted outline of essential
elements of regulatory reform. Also, many states seek to accomplish more than
one goal with their reform. Numerous states want to promote competition in
the gas commodity market to avoid uneconomic bypass by providing gas at the
lowest possible price. 64 However, they also want to minimize any shifting of
costs to customers65 and to protect their utilities from incurring unrecoverable
costs. 6 6 A few states have also attempted to use unbundling to promote the
Commission has adopted rules mandating that its utilities offer transportation services. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
of W. Va., Legislative Rule, Chap. 24-1, Series XVI, Rules Governing the Transportation of Natural Gas,
§§ 1.0-9.0 [hereinafter W. Va. Transp. Rules] (adopted in In riNatural Gas Transp.- Policies, 81 P.U.R.4th
453, 464-70 (W.Va. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1987)). For a summary of these rules, see Natural Gas Marketing
and Transportation Committee: 1990 Annual Report, supra note 44, at 94.
59. The Wisconsin Commission has announced regulatory principles applicable to transportation
programs that it "strongly encourages" Wisconsin utilities to follow. In re Natural Gas Distribution Util.,
84 P.U.R.4th 629, 638 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1987). For a summary of these principles, see Natural
Gas Marketing and Transportation Committee: 1990 Annual Report, supra note 44, at 94-95.
60. See, e.g., In re Midwest Gas Co., 110 P.U.R.4th 40 (Iowa Dep't Comm. Util. Div. 1990) (adopting
settlement agreement authorizing LDC to provide transportation service to noncaptive industrial customers
at flexible rates); In re Consumers Power Co., 108 P.U.R.4th 301 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989)
(instituting program for natural gas transportation service, including both cost- and market-based tariffs);
In re Wisconsin Gas Co., 103 P.U.R.4th 487 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989) (authorizing LDC to offer
service to customers electing to have the company arrange acquisition of gas supplies and pipeline
transportation capacity); In re Mountain Fuel Supply Co. for Approval of Interruptible Indus. Transp. Rates,
No. 86-057-07 (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n Apr. 27, 1988) (approving interruptible gas transportation policy).
61. For example, California designed a comprehensive unbundling policy in 1986 and completely
rewrote it only five years later. See In re Regulatory Framework for Gas Util., 79 P.U.R.4th I (Cal. Pub.
Util. Comm'n 1986); see also In re Rulemaking on the Structure of Gas Util. Procurement Practices and
Refinements to the Regulatory Framework for Gas Util., supra note 45.
62. The variations of unbundling and regulatory responses to it are discussed in detail infra Part H.
63. FERC's unbundling policies for interstate pipelines and the principles applicable to interstate
pipelines provide insights for regulators of intrastate facilities. See Means & Cohn, supra note 10; Deborah
A. Cohn & Robert C. Means, Common Carriage of Natural Gas: A Preliminary Analysis of the Issues (Oct.
1983) (unpublished manuscript, on file in Harvard Law School Library).
64. Pennsylvania expected increased competition in gas retailing to result in increased efficiency in
the LDCs' gas purchasing practices with resulting benefits for traditional customers. In re Regulations
Governing Intrastate Natural Gas Transp. Rates and Serv., supra note 56, at 3.
65. Pennsylvania codified its intent to pursue open access under terms which "minimize the shifting
of costs to retail customers." 52 PA. CODE § 60.1 (1990). However, the Pennsylvania Public Utilities
Commission explained in its adopting order that cost shifting would be permitted if the benefits of the policy
change outweighed the concerns over the cost shift. In re Regulations Governing Intrastate Natural Gas
Transp. Rates and Serv., supra note 56, at 3.
66. Pennsylvania also indicated its intent to avoid reformatory action that would cause the utility to
face unrecoverable costs. 52 PA. CODE § 60.1 (1990).
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development of indigenous natural gas.67 In light of these assorted aims, it is
not surprising that the existing regulatory regimes are so diverse.68
II. Rebundling the Regulation of Natural Gas Utility Services: Approaches that
Have Evolved in the States
A. The Theoretical Underpinnings of Post- Unbundling Regulatory
Reform
Unbundling changes the traditional function of the LDC in the natural gas
industry. Regulation should be reformed to respond to these changes and to
achieve the goals of unbundling. An understanding of regulatory theory pro-
vides valuable insights into if and how traditional intrastate LDC regulation
should be modified to accommodate unbundling.
1. The Changes to the LDC Effected by Unbundling and their Regulatory
Implications
After unbundling, the LDC will still provide prepackaged service to those
customers who find it cheaper to have the LDC procure and transport their gas.
Today, these probably comprise the bulk of the LDC's customers. The LDC
will also provide, however, a transportation service which may be purchased
without buying the gas retailing function. Regulators should adopt two new and
different policies designed to suit the differences between the individually
offered gas retailing and the transportation function. These policies should be
adopted in addition to the traditional LDC regulatory policies for bundled
functions.
The LDC's unbundled gas retailing service differs substantially from its
traditional, bundled gas sales service. Prior to unbundling, the LDC was the
only gas retailer available to most end users and was appropriately regulated
as a monopoly. It was traditionally subject to rate and production regulation.
This meant, first, that the LDC was required to sell gas to everyend user at
the same price (the weighted average cost of its supplies of gas (WACOG)),
and second, that the LDC's acquisition of gas was regulated to assure a
67. Pennsylvania specifically advocated unbundling as a way of promoting the development of
Pennsylvania natural gas. Id. Indeed, it attempted to favor the transportation of gas produced in Pennsylva-
nia by setting the maximum rate for transportation of that gas at the rate justified through a cost of service
study. In contrast, Pennsylvania set transportation rates for other gas using the gross margin approach,
presumably leading to rates, at least to industrial customers, higher than those that would be adopted under
a cost-based approach. Id. at § 60.2(4); In re Regulations Governing Intrastate Natural Gas Transp. Rates
and Serv., supra note 56, at 5-9.
68. Cf. Blaydon, supra note 30, at 161 ("Considering this heterogeneity [of ownership, service offerings
and vertical integration) among LDCs, it is not surprising that the regulatory standards of fifty-one state
jurisdictions are so widely diverse.").
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reasonable and prudent supply of gas at a reasonable and prudent price. After
unbundling, the LDC will be subject to heavy competition from independent
retailers of gas. Regulation tailored for LDCs as monopoly retailers of gas is
inappropriate if and when they function in a competitive marketplace.
Therefore, a new policy should be designed to ensure the development of a fair
and efficient competitive marketplace for gas retailing.
The LDC's unbundled transportation service has one characteristic which
distinguishes it for regulatory purposes from the LDC's traditional
transportation service. Although the LDC's gas distribution pipeline has the
same monopoly characteristics that existed prior to unbundling,6 9 this mono-
poly is now an essential element of the competitive gas retailing market. Sellers
and buyers of unbundled natural gas need easy access to transportation. Thus,
a new regulatory policy designed to open access to the common carrier portion
of the pipeline should be adopted. 70 At the same time, because the LDC still
has a monopoly on transportation of gas,7' transportation rate regulation, such
as existed prior to unbundling, remains appropriate.
2. The Possible Goals of Unbundling and the Feasibility of their Attain-
ment
The new regulatory policies that are developed to provide a fair and
efficient market in the retailing of gas and open access to the common carrier
should meet the primary goal of unbundling and as many secondary regulatory
goals as possible. The primary goal of unbundling is elimination of the threat
of uneconomic bypass. This goal is accomplished by fostering an environment
where gas users can obtain market priced gas transported at cost-based rates.
Many regulators would like to satisfy additional goals with post-unbundling
regulatory reform 7 including prevention of cost shifting and stranded
investment 7 and improvement in business for local gas producers. Review
69. This monopoly characteristic demands continued classical regulation. Id. at 169.
70. See John R. Meyer & William B. Tye, Toward Achieving Workable Competition in Industries
Undergoing a Transition to Deregulation: A Contractual Equilibrium Approach, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 273,
276 (1988); see also William B. Tye, Competitive Access: A Comparative Industry Approach to the Essential
Facility Doctrine, 8 ENERGY L.J. 337 (1987).
71. LDCs have a monopoly on distribution in most areas of the country. See supra note 11. However,
competition in distribution is increasing. Recently, the. New York Public Service Commission concluded
that the threat of bypass of LDCs, particularly by large gas users located near interstate pipelines, demanded
the adoption of a policy to prevent LDC bypass. See In re Bypass by Gas Cogeneration Projects, 120
P.U.R.4th 385 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1991).
72. See supra Part I(C) and notes 64-67.
73. Indeed, these two regulatory fears are also at the heart of regulators' concern about bypass. The
fear is that circumvention of the LDC system by large users will cause utilities to lose their investment in
gas and facilities purchased to serve these customers. The result of this stranded investment will be the
shifting of costs to other LDC customers as well as an adverse impact on the utilities.
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of regulatory theory shows that some of these goals can be satisfied and some
cannot.
First the good news. Competition in gas retailing should not threaten the
typical LDC with stranded investment in transportation-related facilities. 4 The
investment is not threatened because unbundling does not affect the monopoly
character of the LDC's transportation service. The LDC will continue to
transport gas to all its preexisting customers, even those who buy gas from
another retailer.75 Therefore, the LDC will continue to receive the same level
of.transportation revenues. If the LDC's transportation business varies at all,
it is likely to improve. Assuming unbundling achieves its goal of lowering gas
prices to the market price, economic theory predicts that the lower price will
lead to higher demand. If this theory correctly predicts the gas market, the
LDC's transportation volume and, therefore, its revenues would increase.
The gas sales-related investment of an LDC may consist of take-or-pay
contracts or minimum commodity purchase commitments with pipelines.76
This investment will be threatened if gas customers switch to non-LDC sources
of supply, leaving the LDC liable to pay -for gas it cannot sell. However, the
take-or-pay costs may be recovered through transportation surcharges on these
customers." Unbundling should not adversely impact most LDCs by creating
stranded investment. On the contrary, unbundling is calculated to minimize this
threat, which is otherwise likely to be caused by uneconomic bypass.
Now the bad news. It is unlikely that many jurisdictions can prevent cost
shifting when they unbundle LDC services. At a minimum, the price of each
unbundled service subject to competition (gas retailing and also, in some
circumstances, transportation) will eventually cover no more than the cost of
providing that service to that class of customer. The whole point of unbundling
is to lower prices to large, price sensitive customers, thereby keeping them on
the LDC's system. To the extent services were cross-subsidized before
unbundling,78 prices will increase for some and decrease for others.79
74. LDCs invest heavily in transportation-related facilities and gas sales-related assets. Fixed gas sales
costs include demand charges, minimum commodity bill payments paid to pipeline suppliers, and take-or-pay
penalties paid to producers.
75. To the extent another pipeline begins to serve any of the LDC's preexisting customers, it will not
be a consequence of unbundling but rather a federal or state policy to encourage, or at least not interfere
with, competition in gas transportation and distribution.
76. The minimum bill obligation is less significant for most LDCs since FERC's minimum bill order,
No. 380, but LDCs in gas producing states usually have take-or-pay contracts with producers. Robert
Johnston & David Sullins, Comments on State Policies Under Pressure, in DRAWING THE LINE ON NATURAL
GAS REGULATION 172, 174-75 (Joseph P. Kalt & Frank C. Schuller eds., 1987).
77. The extent to which surcharges can be imposed may be limited. If these customers have non-gas
alternatives or can be served by another pipeline, then they are likely to switch to those alternatives at the
point where the surcharge boosts their total delivered gas cost above the cost of the alternative.
78. This is quite common under price regulation for different industries. See, e.g., discussions in Meyer
& Tye, supra note 70, at 277, and BREYER, supra note 4, at 293-98.
79. It is theoretically possible that some customers who might otherwise be subject to a price increase
will not fully incur it. If unbundling results in lower prices for the most elastic customers, they may
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For these reasons, unbundling can likely be accomplished without stranding
the utility with investment in unused facilities. However, unbundling is likely
to be accompanied by a shift in prices to the consumers, with an increase in
price felt most likely by previously subsidized residential customers.
Unbundling will benefit local gas production by ending the pipelines'
monopsony in the gas retail market, thereby increasing the likelihood that local
gas producers can find purchasers. However, states should not favor local gas
production with, for example, discounted transportation rates not available to
out-of-state producers. Although unbundling cannot achieve every desirable
outcome, the undesirable effects of unbundling would be magnified without it.
If uneconomic bypass occurs because unbundling is foregone, stranded
investment and cost-shifting to ameliorate the impact of stranded investment
will occur.
B. Post-Unbundling Regulation of the LDC as Gas Retailer
If gas customers are free to buy gas separately from transportation, and
LDCs want to retail gas to them, regulators can respond in one of three ways:
refrain from regulating the LDC operating as an independent gas retailer"0
except to preclude anticompetitive behavior (the "Hands-Off Approach");
comprehensively regulate the activities of the LDC as gas retailer (the "Hands-
On Approach"); or prohibit the LDC from retailing gas separately from
transportation (the "Prohibitory Approach").
1. The Hands-Off Approach
Two characteristics define this approach First, regulators permit the LDC
to compete with independent gas retailers by offering gas sales service
separately from transportation service. Second, regulators refrain from regu-
lating the LDC operating as gas retailer except as necessary to preclude it from
unfairly using its monopoly transportation position and monopoly on bundled
gas service.
There is some variation among the states using this approach." Some
correspondingly increase their consumption of natural gas, thereby increasing total volumes transported by
the LDC and decreasing the per unit cost of transportation.
80. The LDC acts as an independent retailer when it competes with other retailers to provide gas to
certain end users. Over time the retail market may be competitive for all end users, not just the end users
that individually or as a voluntarily-formed group consume large volumes of gas. The subsequent analysis
in this Article assumes that the LDC still acts in a noncompetitive market providing gas to small end users
and is still regulated as a traditional natural monopoly when providing that service.
81. At least five states, Colorado, Kentucky, Maryland, New Mexico and Wisconsin, follow the hands-
off approach with needed regulation to prevent the LDCs, as unbundled gas retailers, from exercising
monopoly powers. See In re Rules of the Pub. Util. Comm'n of Colo. Regulating Gas Transp. Serv., supra
note 46, § 6.1; In re An Investigation of the Impact of Fed. Policy on Natural Gas to Ky. Consumers and
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states require their LDCs to form an affiliate to carry on an unbundled gas
retailing business.82 Two of the states that do not require LDCs to form an
affiliate nevertheless prohibit them from segregating low-priced gas supplies
from their gas supply mix to sell to unbundled customers.83 Of course, these
LDCs could form a marketing subsidiary to provide least-cost gas to price
sensitive end users. 4 So the prohibition on segregating low-priced gas supplies
from the pool of gas otherwise intended to serve system gas customers 5 is,
in reality, just a less direct way of requiring LDCs to form separate subsidiaries
or to form separate bundled and unbundled gas sales operations within the same
corporate structure.
86
The hands-off approach is a regulatory policy well-suited to the charac-
teristics of the LDCs' new unbundled gas retailing service. It is designed to
permit the LDC to function in the competitive gas retailing marketplace as any
other independent gas retailer. The only regulatory constraints on the LDC as
competitive gas retailer are those necessary to keep it from wielding an unfair
advantage over other independent gas retailers. An LDC could potentially use
its transportation monopoly to give itself or its marketing affiliate an advantage
in the unbundled gas retailing market. Assuming the LDC has a marketing
affiliate, the unconstrained LDC could pass its affiliate confidential information
about retailing competitors; give its affiliate preferential access to transportation,
Suppliers, Case No. 297, 38 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n May 29, 1987); In re Interstate Sale and Transp. of
Gas, supra note 49; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-6-4.1(F) (Michie 1988); NMPSC Rules, supra note 52, §§
660.10, 660.16; In re Natural Gas Distribution Util., supra note 59, at 641-42.
As discussed infra Part Il(B)(3), California recently prohibited its LDCs from participating in the
unbundled gas market and from forming new affiliates to do so. At the same time, California adopted the
hands-off approach for its existing LDC marketing affiliates. In re Rulemaking on the Structure of Gas
Util. Procurement Practices and Refinements to the Regulatory Framework for Gas Util., supra note 45,
at 9-10.
82. New Mexico requires its utilities to form separate subsidiaries if they choose to broker or market
gas. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-6-4.1(F) (Michie 1988); NMPSC Rules, supra note 52, § 660.10. In 1987,
independent gas resellers instigated the introduction of a bill in the New Mexico legislature prohibiting LDCs
from participating in unbundled gas retailing, but it was not enacted into law. H.R. 444, 38th Leg., 1st Sess.,
1987 N.M. Laws § 62-6-4.1.
Wisconsin suggests, but does not require, that its utilities set up a subsidiary to market gas to avoid
problems of dedicating special utility gas supplies to specific customers. See In re Natural Gas Distribution
Util., supra note 59, at 641.
83. See In re An Investigation of the Impact of Fed, Policy on Natural Gas to Ky. Consumers and
Suppliers, supra note 81, at 37-38; In re Interstate Sale and Transp. of Gas, supra note 49, at 12.
84. It would be in the interest of such LDCs to form an independent subsidiary to participate. in the
potential profits as well as losses associated with activity in a competitive market.
85. See discussion of separate gas portfolios infra Part n(B)(2).
86. Wisconsin handled the conflict presented by an LDC desiring to target least-cost gas to price
sensitive end users by explicitly encouraging its LDCs to form marketing affiliates. Alternatively, while
declining to prohibit targeted gas arrangements, Wisconsin suggested the utility create a portfolio of spot
market gas to sell to price sensitive customers. The Wisconsin Commission did not clearly state whether
this spot market portfolio was also to be part of the system supply mix. In re Natural Gas Distribution Util.,
supra note 59, at 641. This special gas marketing portfolio idea has been used in California to regulate
extensively LDCs operating as unbundled gas retailers, as discussed infra Part II(B)(2).
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LDC-released gas,87 or other LDC-provided services; provide preferential
rates; or require anticompetitive tying arrangements between LDC-provided
services and an affiliate's services.88
The hands-off approach is consistent with achieving the primary goal of'
unbundling-making market priced natural gaS available to end users. Market
priced gas availability requires fair competition between gas retailers. By
allowing the LDC to become another retailer, the hands-off approach provides
more competition in the market which in turn increases the potential for a fair
and efficient market. This policy also tries to ensure that the LDC is a seller
in the new market just like any other seller by attempting to keep the LDC
from taking any unfair advantage it has because of its related monopolies. A
potential drawback to this approach, however, is the difficulty of enforcing
proscriptions on anticompetitive activity against an LDC determined to give
its marketing affiliate an advantage.89
Those states that require LDC subsidiaries to market unbundled gas wisely
eliminate a potentially large advantage that the LDC might otherwise have over
other gas retailers.9" Because FERC, in reforming its regulation of interstate
pipelines, has grandfathered in LDC use of upstream interstate pipeline
capacity,9' an LDC that markets unbundled gas has a built-in preference to
87. LDC-released gas is gas that the LDC initially purchased as part of its pool of gas to serve its
traditional customers but is later segregated from this pool and released for sale to other gas retailers or
directly to unbundled customers. This released gas is typically either low-priced gas or gas which will be
priced lower once it is segregated from the pool. In either event, it is sold at a lower price than the pooled
gas. The price of the pooled gas is the weighted average cost of all the volumes of gas in the pool.
The regulatory requirement that LDCs which market gas separately, from transportation refrain from
targeting their least-cost gas in the system supply for specific customers is tantamount to prohibiting the
LDC from preferring itself over other independent gas retailers with its released gas. See supra note 82 and
accompanying text.
88. New Mexico, California and Colorado have specified which LDC activities will violate regulations
against anticompetitive behavior, discriminatory conduct and preferential treatment. See NMPSC Rules, supra
note 52, § 660.9(b); Cal. Rules for Gas Util. Procurement, Util. Gas Marketing Affiliates and Gas Sales
to Noncore Customers, as adopted in In re Rulemaking on the Structure of Gas Util. Procurement Practices
and Refinements to the Regulatory Framework for Gas Util., supra note 45, at 9-10, 43; In re Rules of the
Pub. Util. Comm'n of Colo. Regulating Gas Transp. Serv., supra note 46, § 6.1.
89. FERC Order No. 497 establishes standards of conduct and reporting requirements that apply to
every interstate natural gas pipeline affiliated with a marketing or brokering entity. FERC Order No. 497,
Alleged Anticompetitive Practices Related to Marketing Affiliates of Interstate Pipelines, 3 F.E.R.C. Stats.
& Regs. 1 30,820, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,139 (1988), 18 C.F.R. § 161 [hereinafter FERC's Anticompetitive
Practices Rule]. FERC promulgated this Order in response to concerns about the various anticompetitive
activities in which pipelines and their marketing affiliates could engage. 53 Fed. Reg. 22,139 (1988), 18
C.F.R. § 161; Jeffery D. Wagnon, Note, The Marketing Affiliate Rule of Order No. 497: To Whom Does
It Apply?, 10 ENERGY L.J. 121, 122-23 (1989). FERC Order 497-B extends the reporting requirements of
Order 497. FERC Order 497-B, Inquiry Into Alleged Anticompetitive Practices Related to Marketing
Affiliates of Interstate Pipelines; Order Extending Sunset Date, 3 F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. T 30,908, 44 Fed.
Reg. 53,291 (1990) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. § 250).
90. Cf. Curtis Cramer, Natural Gas Pipelines and Monopoly in PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 137,143-
48 (Kenneth Nowotny et al. eds., 1989) (discussing the reasons why pipelines should not be allowed to favor
their retailing/producing affiliates).
91. See FERC Order No. 500, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol,
3 F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,761; 52 Fed. Reg. 30,334 (1987), 18 C.F.R. §§ 2, 284 (1988). A pipeline
that is "upstream" of the LDC is one that hooks into the local distribution system and is capable of
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upstream interstate capacity. The LDC's marketing subsidiary would lose any
competitive advantage.
The hands-off approach also appropriately distinguishes between the market
for bundled gas sales and transportation service, which is still a monopoly of
the LDC, and the market for unbundled gas sales, which is competitive. It
continues traditional regulation of the former, but refrains from regulating the
latter, relying instead on the emergence of competition to transform it into a
fair and efficient market.
As explained above, refusing to permit the unbundling of gas services
contributes to the incidence of uneconomic bypass and its. attendant adverse
impacts on the utility and its remaining customers. However, unbundling gas
services and allowing customers to use nonsystem supplies of gas may not
preclude all cost shifting; in particular, gas costs may shift. To the extent that
an LDC obtained lower priced gas supplies in the pre-unbundling era because
of the characteristics of certain gas customers, such as large consumption or
high load factor, and these customers switch to non-LDC supplied gas, the price
of the LDC's gas supplies may increase, thus raising the cost of gas to system
supply customers. On the other hand, increased competition in the sale of gas
may decrease the overall market price of gas, including the price of gas for
LDCs. The hands-off approach to regulating the LDC as an independent gas
retailer will, if successful, tend to increase competition in the unbundled
retailing of gas. Thus, this approach will add to any competition-borne tendency
for the price of gas to fall.
2. The Hands-On Approach
The hands-on approach is the opposite of the hands-off approach. The
hands-on approach is characterized by monopoly-like regulation of the LDC,
even when it operates in the competitive gas retailing market. California
pioneered this approach in 1986.92 California's regulation was gas customer,
rather than gas supplier, oriented. It divided gas customers into core and
noncore categories. Core customers are residential and commercial customers
without alternative fuel capacity; noncore customers are the other commercial
customers and large users.93 Noncore customers are permitted to purchase gas
transporting gas to it. Pipeline capacity is space on the pipeline for carrying gas. Gas sellers, buyers or
transporters can permanently reserve capacity for their own exclusive use, which is particularly valuable
in markets where pipeline capacity is inadequate to serve demand. See discussion at infra note 98 and
accompanying text.
92. In re New Regulatory Framework for Gas Util., 79 P.U.R.4th 1 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1986).
However, California recently abandoned this approach, choosing instead to prohibit its LDCs and their
affiliates from operating at all in the unbundled marketplace. See discussion infra Part II(B)(3); see also
In re Rulemaking on the Structure of Gas Util. Procurement Practices and Refinements to the Regulatory
Framework for Gas Util., supra note 45.
93. In re New Regulatory Framework for Gas Util., supra note 92, at 8.
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separately from transportation. The LDCs may sell unbundled gas to noncore
customers, but they are regulatorily constrained in how they can do it. The
LDCs must maintain separate portfolios of gas for the core and noncore
customers, and the LDCs' purchasing, pricing and marketing practices for their
noncore gas portfolios are strictly regulated. For example, the California LDCs
were required to buy their noncore gas only in the spot and short term markets
on contracts for terms of not more than one year.94 Further, the LDCs were
permitted to sell gas out of this portfolio to noncore customers only at the
average portfolio price. Discounting to individual customers or targeting
particular gas supplies for particular customers was prohibited.95 LDCs were
permitted to market gas to end users outside their service territory, but could
only market gas from their noncore portfolio at the average portfolio price.
96
Finally, the LDCs were not prohibited from using information they obtained
through their transportation monopoly to advantage their noncore marketing,
business because the LDCs' activities in the competitive gas market were
considered to be utility activities by the regulators.
The hands-on approach to regulating the LDCs' new unbundled gas retailing
service is not well-suited to the characteristics of the unbundled gas market.
Monopoly-like regulation of a participant in a competitive, or potentially
competitive, market is antithetical to traditional regulatory theory that reserves
such regulation for natural or regulatorily-created monopoly situations. 97
The hands-on approach also is not likely to achieve the goal of preventing
uneconomic bypass by making market priced gas available to customers. Under
this approach, an LDC operating in the unbundled-gas market retains many of
its monopoly advantages, such as its preference for upstream interstate pipeline
capacity and its inside information about the needs of particular customers. To
the extent these advantages are valuable in the new market,98 they could keep
potential gas retailers out of the market, thus constraining potential competition.
The regulated LDC attempting to operate in the unbundled gas market also
bears the disadvantage of unbundled gas supplies regulated by source and price.
94. Id. at 47-48.
95. Id. at 49-50.
96. Id.
97. Neither did California regulators intend to create a monopoly in the provision of unbundled gas:
"[Nloncore customers can choose procurement from either [core or noncore] portfolio or from nonutility
sources." id. at 9.
98. In California, for example, LDCs in the unbundled gas market must have access to upstream
interstate pipeline capacity because there is a shortage of this capacity. In 1989, this dilemma led a coalition
of California end users and non-utility gas producers and marketers to petition the California Public Utilities
Commission to change its regulation. The petitioners stated, "Owing to the utilities' preferential access to
interstate pipeline capacity and storage, . . . most noncore customers are forced to rely upon the utilities
for their gas supplies. This prevents noncore customers from obtaining gas supplies-often at more favorable
prices-from other suppliers." Letter from John W. Leslie, Attorney for Mock Resources, Inc. and Salmon
Resources Ltd., Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, et al., to G. Mitchell Wilk, President, Cal. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 3-4 (July 28, 1989) (on file with author).
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By contrast, non-LDC, independent retailers have the freedom to acquire gas
supplies responsive to end users' needs, rather than regulators' opinions of end
users' needs.99 This regulation also retards the growth of an efficient market
for the sale of unbundled gas because it restricts the ability of the LDCs to use
their unbundled gas supplies to respond to the demands of the customers.
3. The Prohibitory Approach
Under the prohibitory approach, regulators bar both LDCs and their
affiliates from participating in the unbundled gas market. In 1990, California
revamped its regulations to prohibit LDCs in the state from selling unbundled
gas to end users or forming any new marketing affiliates to do so.' °
California decided that the difficulties of regulating the LDC and its marketing
affiliate to prevent undesirable inter-affiliate transactions outweighed the
advantages of LDC and affiliate participation in the unbundled gas market.'0 '
Banning a utility and its affiliates from participating in the competitive,
unbundled gas market is an extreme safeguard against competitive abuse. This
approach is likely to be unpopular,'0 2 but it does not contravene any
traditional regulatory principles.'03 It will have the effect of precluding a
potential retailer, the LDC, from entering the marketplace, but this is not likely
to prevent attainment of a fair and efficient market for the retailing of gas.
99. California recognized this disadvantage but contemplated allowing utilities to develop multiple
noncore portfolios of gas in lieu of deregulating the utilities' procurement of unbundled gas:
[W]e intend to explore the concept of multiple supply portfolios during procurement hearings in
the near future. Multiple supply portfolios would provide the utilities with additional flexibility
to meet the diverse procurement needs of noncore customers. Procurement hearings would also
offer parties the opportunity to consider the issue of deregulating noncore procurement as
recommended by PSD [Public Staff Division].
In re New Regulatory Framework for Gas Util., supra note 92, at 48.
100. In re Rulemaking on the Structure of Gas Util. Procurement Practices and Refinements to the
Regulatory Framework for Gas Util., supra note 45, at 7-9. The Commission added that it would reconsider
the ban on new utility marketing affiliates only if utilities could prove the unbundled gas market was not
providing "reliable and adequate gas supplies to noncore customers." Id. at 9.
101. Id. California's action contrasts with FERC's decision not to require interstate pipelines to divest
themselves of marketing affiliates nor to forbid the pipelines from doing business with their own affiliates.
FERC concluded, "Such structural remedies should be adopted only where they are shown to be necessary
to prevent more seriously anticompetitive practices." FERC's Anticompetitive Practices Rule, supra note
89, 53 Fed. Reg. at 22,141.
102. See, e.g., Inquiry into Alleged Anticompetitive Practices Related to Marketing Affiliates of
Interstate Pipelines, 52 Fed. Reg. 21,578, 21,587-95 (1987) (comments submitted to FERC regarding
possible divestiture of marketing affiliates of interstate pipelines).
103. In response to its inquiry, supra note 102, FERC also received a comment objecting to the
prohibition of pipeline marketing affiliates on the ground that there is "a moral obligation on the part of
the [Federal Energy Regulatory] Commission to permit the pipelines to work off their heavy take or pay
obligations incurred in good faith .... " Id. at 21,591.
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Indeed, it eliminates the threat of anticompetitive activity posed by the entry
of the LDC or its affiliate into the market) °4
The prohibitory approach differs from the hands-off approach only in the
importance accorded to both the advantage of adding the LDC to the unbundled
gas retailing market and the disadvantage that, once there, the LDC might act
to lessen the market's competitiveness. The prohibitory approach is premised
on the belief that the advantage does not outweigh the risk. The hands-off
approach is premised on the belief that the risk can be largely ameliorated by
enacting certain anticompetitive prohibitions. In all other respects, the two
approaches are identical. Thus, the prohibitory approach is as likely, if not more
so, than the hands-off approach to achieve the goal of preventing uneconomic
bypass by making market priced gas available to LDC customers. 10 5 It is also
as likely to be attended by some gas cost-shifting. 6 The prohibitory
approach, like the hands-off approach, is based on the recognition that sale of
unbundled gas should not be a regulated activity and that the development of
a competitive unbundled gas market is the key to the success of unbundling.
C. Post-Unbundling Regulation of the LDC as Gas Transporter
The states that have unbundled gas sales from transportation have designed
various policies to govern access to the unbundled transportation service. All
of these transportation access policies are similar in that they resolve the same
six issues: (1) whether LDCs must, or may, offer unbundled transportation; (2)
which customers will be eligible for unbundled transportation service; (3) which
aspects of transportation will be unbundled; (4) what the status of transporta-
tion-only customers will be in the event of curtailments; (5) whether the LDC
will have a utility-like obligation to serve transportation-only customers who
desire to switch back to prepackaged transportation and gas service; and (6)
how transportation rates will be regulated.
104. Richard Pierce takes the position that the concern that LDCs may act in anticompetitive ways if
regulators permit them to participate in the unbundled market, "cannot be allayed by banning LDCs from
providing unbundled service. Either form of LDC participation in the market creates the risk of
anticompetitive behavior." Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Intrastate Natural Gas Regulation: An Alternative
Perspective, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 407 (1992). On the contrary, banning LDCs from becoming independent
gas retailers does remove the economic incentive the LDC otherwise would have to favor its affiliate with
preferential treatment such as special access to the distribution system. Thus, this approach is a method,
albeit drastic, of eliminating such concern. To the extent Professor Pierce also means to suggest that LDCs
prohibited from operating in the independent gas retailing market still have the potential to prefer themselves
as bundled retailers of gas over unbundled retailers, I agree. See discussion infra Part B(C) regarding
regulation of the LDC as gas transporter to achieve a competitive gas retailing market. However, it does
not follow from this fact that regulators should ignore the additional incentives for anticompetitive behavior
posed by the LDC engaging in the riskier, but potentially more profitable, independent gas retailing business.
105. It is more likely'to achieve this goal if the anticompetitive prohibitions on LDC conduct with a
marketing affiliate do not effectively prevent this behavior.
106. See supra Part 1](B)(I) (discussing cost-shifting that is likely to occur under the hands-off
approach).
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1. Voluntary versus Mandatory Offering of Unbundled Services
Four of the fifteen states that have designed comprehensive state-wide
regulatory policies for unbundling LDC sales and transportation functions,1
0 7
as well as the other states that have unbundled gas and transportation-only
services on a case-by-case basis, have not required their LDCs to offer
unbundled services. This policy of allowing utilities to decide for themselves
whether to offer transportation-only service works against the goal of opening
access to transportation because it invites the LDCs to decline to do so.'08
The regulators fear shifting costs to other customers and burdening the
utility with the administrative costs of unbundling."°9 Although unbundling
may cause rates to rise in the short-term to customers who have been
beneficiaries of regulatory cross-subsidies, it prevents uneconomic bypass and
higher rate increases in the long run. The fear that the utility will incur
unacceptable administrative costs can be assuaged by requiring that adminis-
trative costs caused by unbundling be included in the cost of using unbundled
transportation service. Those customers finding it less expensive to use
unbundled transportation service priced at cost, including associated admin-
istrative costs, will use the cheaper service and pay the utility for the cost it
incurs in offering transportation. To the extent the costs of switching to
transportation-only service are too high for potential subscribers, no customers
will switch and the utility will incur no costs. This approach to unbundling is
calculated to provide more open access and yet avoid the adverse impacts of
unacceptable cost shifting and unrecoverable administrative costs.
2. Eligibility for Unbundled Transportation Service
Two approaches can be used to determine eligibility for unbundled
transportation service: (1) allowing any customer wishing to use the service to
do so; or (2) restricting availability of the service to customers with particular
characteristics, such as consumption levels.
107. These states are Missouri (In re Transp. of Natural Gas, supra note 51,at 79-80 (exemptions from
mandatory transportation available)); Ohio (In re the Commission Ordered Investigation of the Availability
of Gas Transportation Service Provided by Ohio Gas Distribution Utilities to End-Use Customers, No. 85-
800-GA-COI (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n Aug. 1, 1989 (adopting guidelines for determining whether any
voluntary transportation arrangements are reasonable)); Virginia (In re Natural Gas Indus. Rates and Transp.
Policies, supra note 57 (establishing transportation policies to be applied in future cases resolving requests
for transportation)); and Wisconsin (In re Natural Gas Distribution Util., supra note 59 (announcing
regulatory principles applicable to transportation programs voluntarily adopted by LDCs)).
108. Indeed, in Missouri, the regulating guidelines governing mandatory transportation offerings provide
exemptions for LDCs able to show that they cannot feasibly implement the required transportation program
or that doing so will result in an increase in costs to non-transporting customers, all the LDCs subsequently
filed affidavits of exemption from mandatory transportation service. In re Transp. of Natural Gas, supra
note 51, at 125. Kansas Power & Light later filed transportation tariffs effective May 1. 1990.
109. See, e.g., id.
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Several states follow the first approach and allow any customer procuring
his own gas to have access to unbundled transportation. 0 This approach to
eligibility is the one best calculated to open access to transportation. Assuming
the transportation rate is the same whether the customer buys bundled or
unbundled service,"' customers will buy their own gas if it is cheaper to do
so. No artificial barriers imposed by regulators will preclude these customers
from participating in the competitive gas retailing market." 2
Other, many states restrict eligibility for transportation-only service to
customers who purchase a minimum volume of gas. Still other states limit the
availability of transportation to specified classes of end users, such as
consumers able to switch to oil. Some states limit transportation service only
to those customers willing to enter into long-term contracts. Those states that
impose, or permit their LDCs to impose, a minimum volume requirement seem
to do so because they believe it is necessary to protect their LDCs from
unreasonable administrative costs associated with minimal volumes of gas." 3
However, instead of imposing a flat prohibition on transportation of small
quantities of gas, regulators could assess an additional charge for the actual
administrative cost associated with transporting that volume) 14 In this way
the customer, not the regulator nor the LDC, decides whether it is worthwhile
to him to transport a small volume of gas with a high administrative cost. Thus,
no customer will unintentionally be closed out of the competitive gas retailing
market." 5
110. These states include Colorado, Iowa, New Mexico, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
111. See infra Part H](C)(6)(b) (discussing problems arising when these rates differ).
112. Virginia expressed a similar view when it warned utilities not to submit transportation tariffs that
limited access: "We have concern over tariff conditions imposing minimum terms or volumes and other
conditions which may be contrary to the market." In re Natural Gas Indus. Rates and Transp. Policies,
supra note 57, at 71.
113. See, e.g., In re Transp. of Natural Gas, supra note 51, at 80 ("[Tjhe local distribution company
may establish reasonable minimum volume eligibility requirements based on a consideration of the
transaction and administrative costs associated with providing transportation service to customers with
varying usage levels"); In re An Investigation of the Impact of Fed. Policy on Natural Gas to Ky. Consumers
and Suppliers, supra note 81, at 53 ("The Commission finds that LDCs should offer transportation on a
nondiscriminatory basis. This means that transportation will be available to any end user Who can arrange
for its own supply of natural gas unless the capacity simply does not exist. The Commission is aware that
problems do occur with load balancing and accounting for receipt and delivery of natural gas in
transportation. Thus, availability may be subject to a minimum volume requirement that will address these
concerns"); In re Interstate Sale and Transp. of Gas, supra note 49, at 9 ("[Ain LDC's tariff may include
restrictions on the availability of transportation services to customers to the extent that such restrictions are
reasonably based upon operating and load management conditions. Examples of reasonably based operating
conditions include minimum gas quality standards, minimum volume requirements, minimum time
requirements (i.e., duration of a transportation agreement), and load balancing provisions and penalties").
114. This is an example of the general proposition that many problems seemingly created for LDCs
by unbundling can be eliminated by viewing the problems as merely costs of doing business which can be
incorporated into the rate charged for the service. For a broad discussion of this approach to eliminating
hurdles to a transportation policy, see Robert C. Means, A Rate Design Alternative for Dealing with
Potential Shifts from Sales to Transportation (Apr. 1984) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
115. The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission declined to establish a generic volume limit for
availability of gas transportation because of just this possibility-"that a utility in the Commonwealth could
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Whether customers can pool their individual gas demands to meet any
volume minimum for transportation becomes an issue in those states that
impose minima. In Pennsylvania, for example, regulators have limited pooling
to three or fewer customers," 6 finding that this is the best balance of the
potential benefits to customers of access to transportation service with the costs
to the LDC of administering the service."7 Again, in order to increase access
to unbundled transportation service, a better approach is to let the customer
balance the benefits and costs of using transportation himself. If the regulator
instead required the LDC to determine the cost of administering pools of
demand and required customers to pay these costs, the regulator would avoid
imposing unrecoverable costs on the LDC without discouraging potential
customers from using unbundled transportation service.
Some states limit the availability of unbundled transportation service to
specified classes of end users. For example, in 1985, California divided
customers into core and noncore categories, permitting only noncore customers
and core customers using more than 250,000 therms per year to use
transportation service." 8 The California Commission's primary reason for
prohibiting some core customers from using transportation was concern-over
the possibility that customers would make the wrong gas purchasing
decision." 9 This is classic regulatory paternalism."2 Even if we assume the
accommodate a transportation customer at a lower volume." In re Regulations Governing Intrastate Natural
Gas Transp. Rates and Serv., supra note 56, at 19. The Commission did, however, give each utility the
authority to establish a minimum. See 52 PA. CODE § 60.3(a) (1990).
Two of the states that initially imposed volume minima on transportation customers have changed their
policies. After operating for less than one year under a statute limiting the availability of transportation to
consumers using 25,000 or more decatherms of gas a year, 1984 N.Y. Laws ch. 519, N.Y. PUB. SERv. LAW
§ 66-d (McKinney 1989), the New York Legislature amended the law to eliminate any minimum. 1985 N.Y.
Laws ch. 790, N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 66-d (McKinney 1989). The Legislature made this change on finding
that "[m]any small manufacturers and other consumers of natural gas" wanted to buy their own gas, a 25,000
decatherm limit was "inexcusably restrictive," and "natural gas production and sales would be enhanced
in the state" if more customers participated in the competitive gas retailing market. Id. After two years'
experience administering a transportation policy provision that allowed LDCs to impose a "reasonable
minimum volume ... [of up to] 100 MBtu per day" on transportation customers, the New Mexico Public
Service Commission eliminated the ability of LDCs to impose any volume minimum. In re Transportation
of Natural Gas by Public Utilities, 65 P.U.R.4th 287, 293 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 198).
116. 52 PA. CODE § 60.3(b) (1990).
117. In re Regulations Governing Intrastate Natural Gas Transp. Rates and Serv., supra note 56, at
19.
118. In re New Regulatory Framework for Gas Utilities, supra note 92, at 8. Core customers are
residential consumers and commercial consumers without alternative fuel capacity; noncore customers are
the other commercial consumers as well as industrial and large users. Id.
California recently revamped its gas transportation policies, but this prohibition on providing unbundled
transportation service to core customers has remained. See In re Rulemaking on the Structure of Gas Util.
Procurement Practices and Refinements to the Regulatory Framework for Gas Util., supra note 45.
However, the California Public Utilities Commission subsequently announced that up to 10% of each
California LDC's core load can pool its gas demand to reach the 250,000 therm volume minimum for un-
bundled transportation'for core customers. In re New Regulatory Framework for Gas Utilities, 120
P.U.R.4th 394, 403 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1991).
119. California limited the availability of unbundled transportation service (and thus, unbundled gas
procurement) to large customers and those with alternative fuel capabilities because of the Commission's
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Commission is justified in believing core customers are likely to make the
wrong decision about purchasing gas, the market is likely to develop protections
for these consumers. 2 ' If the Commission is not satisfied with the market's
protections in the transition period, the Commission can protect these customers
from the worst consequences of a bad decision without precluding core
customers who will make the right decisions from participating in the
competitive gas retailing market. For example, the Commission could require
the LDC to standby with a safety net of gas for customers who are defrauded
by an independent gas seller.'22 Also, the Commission could enable core
customers disillusioned with the competitive gas retailing market to return to
the LDC's bundled gas and transportation services. 23 These alternatives
would protect customers from any potential life- or business-threatening absence
of gas while not unduly retarding the development of the competitive gas
market. The flat prohibition on core participation in this market seems an
unnecessary hindrance to achievement of the goal of unbundling."
The Commission's administrative cost concerns can be handled by passing
on the administrative cost to those who avail themselves of the opportunity to
benefit from unbundled services. In short, a regulatory injunction against certain
classes of consumers using unbundled transportation unnecessarily thwarts the
goal of establishing a competitive gas retailing market. Even if regulators'
concerns about the possible costs to the consumers and the utilities of more
participation in this market are justified, alternative means of allaying those
fears are available that do not interfere with the development of the market.
3. The Extent of Unbundling
Unbundling gas transportation and sales services means allowing the LDC
to price and sell these services separately. Some states have gone further with
their unbundling efforts and allowed or required utilities to price and offer
separately the numerous traditional services usually provided under the
finding that they are "generally large and sophisticated" and the ones "likely to be best equipped to
participate in a competitive marketplace and make well-reasoned decisions regarding natural gas service
for themselves." In re Rulemaking on the Structure of Gas Util. Procurement Practices and Refinements
to the Regulatory Framework for Gas Util., supra note 45, at 14. Anqther reason given for limiting
transportation service to large customers was to lighten the administrative burden on the utility of "customers
requesting information and contracts." Id.
120. Paternalism is atypical, albeit questionable,justification for economic regulation. BREYERsupra
note 4, at 33-34.
121. For example, the market may respond to the risk of an independent retailer's failure to provide
gas by requiring brokers to post performance bonds. Brokers may eventually be subject to state licensing
or other entry regulation. See Blaydon, supra note 30, at 164-65.
122. In fact, the California Commission has imposed such a requirement on LDC service to noncore
customers. See discussion infra note 132.
123. See infra Part 1(C)(5) (discussing ways this could be accomplished).
124. But see Pierce, Intrastate Natural Gas, supra note 104.
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categories "transportation" and "sales." For example, an LDC's bundled
transportation service traditionally includes the gathering and processing of gas,
if the LDC transports gas directly from the wellhead, or the right to
transportation capacity in one or more intrastate or interstate pipelines, if the
LDC purchases its gas from a pipeline. An LDC also typically provides to its
bundled customers the choice of either firm or interruptible transportation and,
perhaps, peak and off-peak service. Under the generic label of "gas sales
service," the LDC provides gas storage, load balancing, and, for those
customers taking service under contract, standby sales service.
Most of the states that have allowed their utilities to unbundle transportation
and sales services have required them to offer"2 standby gas sales
service. 26 Most of the states that have unbundled have also required their
utilities to offer both firm and interruptible transportation services to trans-
portation customers if the LDCs offer such options to traditional customers. 27
However, most of the states that have adopted unbundling policies have been
silent on the question of whether utilities could separately offer and price gas
and transportation subservices.' 28  A notable exception is Kentucky, which
125. States requiring that standby service be offered include: Iowa, see 250 IOWA ADMIN. CODE §
19.13(1) (Supp. 1989) (requiring that firm and interruptible service be provided with and without standby
service); Kentucky, see In re An Investigation of the Impact of Fed. Policy on Natural Gas to Ky.
Consumers and Suppliers, supra note 81, at 37 (requiring that standby service be offered); Maryland, see
In re Interstate Sale and Transp. of Gas, supra note 49, at 10 ('The tariff for transportation services shall
contain a provision which offers transportation customers the right to elect standby-type sales service.");
and Pennsylvania, see 52 PA. CODE § 60.5 (1990) ("Standby retail service ... shall be made available to
transportation service customers .... ").
Colorado and Ohio did not explicitly require their utilities to offer standby service when they authorized
the separate transportation of gas, but they appear to contemplate that utilities will nevertheless provide it.
See In re Rules of the Pub. Util. Comm'n of Colo. Regulating Gas Transp. Serv., supra note 46, § 2.4(e)
("Within each class, a transportation customer who has contracted for standby supply service .... "); In
re Investigation of the Availability of Gas Transp. Serv. Provided by Ohio Gas Distribution Util. to End-Use
Customers, supra note 54, app. A, $ 8 ("Where gas-related services such as supply back-up are contracted
for, the cost of providing such service shall be in addition to the basic transportation rate.").
126. At least one state, Wisconsin, has mandated the purchase of standby sales service by any
transportation customer who provides essential services to the community. See In re Natural Gas
Distribution Util., supra note 59, at 639; see also discussion infra Part Il(C)(1). Essential services are de-
fined as those offered by schools, hospitals, nursing homes and similar institutions. Irt re Natural Gas
Distribution Util., supra note 59, at 639.
127. See, e.g., In re Rulemaking on the Structure of Gas Util. Procurement Practices and Refinements
to the Regulatory Framework for Gas Util., supra note 45, at 17, 23, 25 (Commission requires utilities to
provide firm and interruptible transportation services); 250 IoWA ADMIN. CODE § 19.13(3) (Supp. 1989)
(requiring utilities to provide firm and interruptible services); In re Interstate Sale and Transportation of
Gas, 80 P.U.R.4th 1,6-7 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986); In re Intrastate Natural Gas Transp. Serv.,supra
note 50, at 23; NYPSC Order, supra note 53, at 20-30 (interruptible transportation service must be offered
to all, not just existing interruptible customers); In re Investigation of the Availability of Gas Transp. Serv.
Provided by Ohio Gas Distribution Util. to End-Use Customers, supra note 54, app. A, $ 8; 52 PA. CODE
§ 60 (1990); In re Regulations Governing Intrastate Natural Gas Transp. Rates and Serv., at 236 (declining
to mandate interruptible transportation option but stressing that "LDCs which do have capacity constraints
remain free to file interruptible transportation rates."); W.Va. Transp. Rules, supra note 58, § 3.2 ("Utilities
and intrastate pipelines shall offer, at a minimum, both firm and interruptible transportation services.").
128. For example, Colorado's transportation rules are broad enough to permit utilities to separately
price and offer transportation and sales subservices. See In re Rules of the Pub. Util. Comm'n of Colo.
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has required'29 every LDC to tariff and provide separately all services which
"should be [separately] provided in order to compete or that may be requested
by its customers."' 3 °
Kentucky's approach is the best calculated to achieve open access. Under
this approach, if the LDC provides a subservice that is also available in the
competitive market, the LDC must offer it to customers separately, instead of
requiring it to be purchased as part of a package that includes a necessary
monopoly service. An example may make this point more clearly. An LDC's
transportation service, and thus its transportation rate, typically includes an
intrastate or interstate pipeline demand charge to cover the LDC's need for
capacity on that pipeline (Pipeline A) to deliver gas to the LDC. A
transportation-only customer, however, may be procuring gas from Pipeline
B,131 or from another Supplier using its own reserved capacity on Pipeline
A, not the LDC's reserved capacity on Pipeline A. In any of these scenarios,
the customer will have to pay his independent gas supplier a demand charge
associated with Pipeline B or with the supplier's capacity on Pipeline A. If the
customer is also required to pay the LDC a demand charge associated with
capacity on Pipeline A, which the customer is not using, the customer is paying
more than the market price for gas delivered. Thus, the customer remains
tempted to engage in uneconomic bypass. Indeed, the double charge for
delivery of his gas may dissuade the customer and those similarly situated from
Regulating Gas Transp. Serv., supra note 46. Pennsylvania likewise uses broad language allowing its utilities
to tax and offer separately "the components of transportation service to afford customers flexibility in
choosing the degree of supply risk they are willing to assume." 52 PA. CODE § 60.2(1) (1990). But this
flexibility appears limited by another provision of the Pennsylvania Code which requires that services be
offered "under terms, conditions and rates which minimize the shifting of costs to retail customers and
provide the natural gas utility with an opportunity to recover the fixed costs incurred to serve the
transportation service customers." Id. at § 60.1. Unbundling services is very likely to cause cost shifting.
See discussion supra Part i](B)(1).
129. West Virginia has invited, but not required, its utilities to "further propose to unbundle services
associated with both firm and interruptible transportation which may be appropriate to their individual
operating capabilities and characteristics." W.Va. Transp. Rules, supra note 58, § 3.2.
130. In re An Investigation of the Impact of Fed. Policy on Natural Gas to Ky. Consumers and
Suppliers, supra note 81, at 38. A Kentucky LDC not wishing to provide such a service hIs the burden of
proving that it cannot or should not do so. Id. at 37. Several other states have required the unbundling of
a few subservices in addition to firm and interruptible transportation and standby sales. Oregon additionally
requires its utilities to provide separately for storage and load balancing or "show why it is not practical"
to offer them. In re Natural Gas Transp. Serv., supra note 55, at 218. California requires its LDCs to remove
their interstate pipeline demand charges from the rates of transportation customers. In re Rulemaking on
the Structure of Gas Util. Procurement Practices and Refinements to the Regulatory Framework fpr Gas
Util., supra note 45, at 26. Indeed, California removed all demand charges from the transportation rates
of all transportation customers except UEGs but replaced them with use-or-pay charges for transportation
customers. Id. at 17, 26. New Mexico does not require, but authorizes, its utilities to provide separately gas
processing, gas gathering, gas storage, load balancing and off-peak transportation services. NMPSC Rules,
supra note 52, § 660.8.
131. Many end users have access to more than one pipeline because of the numerous interstate and
intrastate pipelines serving the more highly populated states. Al H. Ringleb, The Natural Gas Regulatory
Dilerma: A Market Solution, Another Complex Compromise, Or the Status Quo?, 6 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y
107, 130 (1985).
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participating in the direct gas sales market, with the possible consequence that
the gas retailing market will not develop fairly and efficiently. This is contrary
to the whole point of unbundling.
The wisdom of the second prong of Kentucky's approach, requiring the
LDC to make separately available a subservice requested by a customer, is also
best illustrated with an example. A traditional LDC customer contemplating
becoming a transportation-only customer is likely to want to continue using
some of the same transportation subservices he has been using. For example,
a traditional LDC customer using interruptible transportation service is likely
to continue to want interruptible transportation service for gas procured from
an independent gas retailer. In short, the LDC should continue to offer to
unbundled customers the same services it offers to bundled customers.
Therefore, those states that require their utilities to offer both firm and
interruptible transportation services to transportation-only customers, if they
offer both firm and interruptible transportation to traditional, bundled customers
are acting consistently with achieving the goal of opening access to the
common carrier portion of the LDC's system.
Similarly, those states requiring LDCs to offer standby gas sales service are
acting consistently with the goal of open access. Standby gas sales service
means the customer and the LDC contract such that the LDC will stand ready
to supply the customer with gas if his demand unexpectedly exceeds his non-
LDC supply of gas. This contrasts with emergency sales service, where the
LDC supplies the unexpectedly needy customer with gas even though the LDC
has no contract to do so. 132 Because many gas customers, such as hospitals
and universities, are unlikely to venture into the new market of independent gas
retailing without the security of the gas supply they previously enjoyed, a
requirement that the LDC offer gas sales standby service eliminates this
impediment to the development of a gas retailing market. Over time, the market
may provide this service, and regulators will not have to require LDCs to do
so. If standby service is priced to cover cost, this requirement can be imposed
without harm to the LDC or its traditional customers.'33 Other services a
customer may request are likely to be those upon which he relied prior to
becoming a transportation-only customer. For example, a traditional sales
132. California neither requires nor authorize its LDCs to provide standby service, although it does
require them to provide emergency service. See In re Rulemaking on the Structure of Gas Util. Procurement
Practices and Refinements to the Regulatory Framework for Gas Util., supra note 45, at 38. Note that
California calls its LDCs' emergency services "standby services," but it does not meet the "contracted for"
criteria of standby service, and it is given the lowest priority in periods of curtailment. Id.
133. Richard Pierce would not require LDCs to offer standby service because he believes state
regulators will not be able to establish cost-based rates for standby service. Pierce, Intrastate Natural Gas,
supra note 104, at 414-15. However, Frank Graves, James Read, and Paul Carpenter have already begun
analyzing how to value this service. See Frank C. Graves, James A. Read, Jr., & Paul R. Carpenter,
.Estimating the Cost of Switching Rights on Natural Gas Pipelines, 10 ENERGY J. 59 (1989) (showing how
option pricing techniques can be used to calculate the value of standby service).
The Yale Journal on Regulation
customer has excellent security of-supply. Even though he opts to purchase gas
from an independent retailer, he may still wish, and be willing to pay for, a
secure back-up supply of gas.
134
Since many LDCs have been hostile to opening access to their distribution
system, regulators may have to require, rather than just authorize, their LDCs
to unbundle transportation and sales subservices to get effective open access
practices. The primary fear regulators have faced in deciding to unbundle
subservices is that separately pricing and offering these services will lead some
customers neither take nor to pay for them, resulting in an increase in price to
remaining customers. This is a short-sighted view of cost-shifting. In the long
run, more unnecessary cost-shifting will occur if uneconomic bypass is
permitted.'35
Additionally, there are two frequently overlooked advantages to full
unbundling of subservices. First, full unbundling may indirectly help local gas
producers. Gas producers face stiff competition from each other because
availability of natural gas in the United States still greatly exceeds demand. In
states that have not unbundled pipeline demand charges from their LDCs'
transportation service, customers sometimes are faced with paying double
demand charges. In some markets with stiff gas-on-gas competition, it may be
that producers, not consumers, are paying this double charge. Unbundling this
subservice would eliminate the unnecessary charge to gas producers. Second,
full unbundling will keep the LDCs' independent gas retailing affiliates on the
same footing as other independent retailers. In those markets served by more
than one pipeline, independent gas retailers using a pipeline other than the one
used by the LDC and, often, by its marketing affiliate, will not suffer the
134. The cost of the right to choose between gas supplied by an independent retailer and LDC system
gas can be substantial. See, e.g., Graves, et al., supra note 133, at 18 (showing a value of $10 per
switchable mcf for a year of rights to leave a fixed contract in an idealized market even when the spot price
is equal to the fixed contract price).
135. The Pennsylvania Commission understood this issue. The Commission explicitly incorporated its
concern about cost-shifting in its rules governing open access: "Transportation service shrlld be provided
under terms, conditions and rates which minimize the shifting of costs to retail customers .... " 52 PA.
CODE § 60.1 (1990). However, the Commission also recognized that, even though cost-shifting cannot
always be prevented, itis nevertheless preferable to business as usual without open access. In the rulemaking
leading to the adoption of the Pennsylvania rules, one LDC argued that it was inconsistent with the public
interest to adopt an open access policy which permitted any shifting of costs. The Commission rejected this
position, noting that the. benefits of open access would often outweigh the disadvantages of cost-shifting.
The Commission stated:
With regard to [Philadelphia Electric Company's] comments, we have crafted our policy to
minimize concerns over cost shifting, but this concern must be weighed against the expected
benefits of our policy. With increased gas transportation, LDCs will have an added incentive to
increase the efficiency of their gas purchasing practices, providing benefits to all classes of
customers.
79 P.U.R.4th 224, 228.
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competitive disadvantage of having to pay the LDC pipeline's demand charge
as well as their own.
4. Status in the Event of Curtailment
Every open access policy needs to determine the transportation-only
customer's priority in the event of a transportation curtailment (also called a
service interruption) and a supply curtailment. Almost every state responds to
the possibility of a transportation curtailment by giving the transportation-only
customer the same priority he would have if he were a traditional bundled
customer.'36 New York does not follow the majority approach, but rather gives
transportation customers a curtailment priority between the traditional customers
receiving firm transportation and those with interruptible transportation.'
The majority approach is most consistent with the goal of open access. It leaves
both traditional and transportation-only customers in the same position they
stood prior to the advent of transportation-only service. Maintaining this status
quo has no adverse cost-shifting or stranded investment results. However, the
alternative of penalizing traditional customers for seeking a cheaper supply of
gas by lowering their curtailment priority could create a disincentive to
becoming transportation-only customers. It is unwise to leave these customers
subject to the lure of uneconomic bypass when nothing is gained by the policy.
Policies concerning supply curtailment are characterized by even more
variability among the states.' This issue is more complicated, in part because
regulators are concerned with multiple categories of supply: the LDC-owned
gas being sold to the LDC's traditional customers, the LDC-owned gas being
sold on standby or on an emergency basis to the transportation customers, and
the non-LDC-owned gas in the LDC's distribution system. Curtailment policy
in the first category of supply, the LDC-owned gas being sold to the LDC's
136. See, e.g., In re Rulemaking on the Structure of Gas Util. Procurement Practices and Refinements
to the Regulatory Framework for Gas Util., supra note 45, at 23; In re Rules of the Pub. Util. Comm'n of
Colo. Regulating Gas Transp. Serv., supra note 46, § 2.4(a); 250 IOWA ADMiN. CODE, supra note 47,
.§ 19.13(2)(b); in re An Investigation of the Impact of Fed. Policy on Natural Gas to Ky. Consumers and
Suppliers, supra note 81, at 51-52; In re Transp. of Natural Gas, suipra note 51, at 82; NMPSC Rules, supra
note 52, § 660.7(b)(1); In re Natural Gas Transp. Serv., supra note 55, at 224; In re Natural Gas Transp.
Policies, supra note 58, at 470, §§ 7.1, 7.2.
Additionally, in California and Massachusetts where transportation-only customers can negotiate
interruptible transportation rates based on the value of the service to them, customers paying more for
interruptible transportation will receive a curtailment priority above interruptible customers paying less.
In re Rulemaking on the Structure of Gas Util. Procurement Practices and Refinements to the Regulatory
Framework for Gas Util., supra note 45, at 24; In re Intrastate Natural Gas Transp. Serv., supra note 50,
at 53.
137. Opinion and Order Requiring the Filing of Transportation Tariffs No. 28672 at 12 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Apr. 24, 1984) [hereinafter N.Y. Opinion].
138. The discussion in this part concerns only the issues presented by a shortage in the LDC-owned
gas supply. The issue presented by a shortage in a customer-owned gas supply is different. See discussion
infra Part fI(C)(1) for a discussion of the LDCs' obligation to serve transportation-only customers desiring
to return to the LDCs' gas supply.
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traditional customers, is not affected by the adoption of an open access policy.
The curtailment priorities for traditional customers will remain the same in the
event of a supply shortage where states adopt an open access policy.
Only two states have addressed the effects of a shortage on transportation
customers receiving standby gas from the LDC. Both Colorado and New
Mexico provide that these customers will have their standby supplies of gas
curtailed on the same basis as if they were traditional customers.'39 This
approach leaves all customers in the same position they were prior to the
initiation of transportation-only service and fosters open access without any
adverse consequences."4
The states vary in the amount of control they allow LDCs to exert over non-
LDC-owned gas in the distribution system when the LDC experiences a
shortfall in its supply. A few states flatly prohibit the LDC from appropriating
this gas unless the transportation customer agrees to sell it to the LDC.14' The
others allow the LDC to seize gas in certain circumstances to serve certain
traditional customers.
142
Even though various state provisions relating to curtailment of non-LDC-
owned gas are different, they all provide the transportation-only customer with
a gas supply at least as secure as he had as a traditional customer. Thus, these
provisions present no disincentive to a traditional customer considering
purchasing gas in the competitive market and are consistent with the goal of
open access and prevention of uneconomic bypass. The first option, allowing
a transportation customer exclusive control of his gas even in a supply
emergency, puts him in a better position than he was as a traditional customer.
In this sense it gives him an artificial incentive to buy non-LDC supplied
139. In re Rules of the Pub. Util. Comm'n of Colo. Regulating Gas Transp. Serv., supra note 46, §
2.4(d); NMPSC Rules, supra note 52, § 660.7(b)(3).
140. California is the only state to specify a curtailment policy for LDC-owned gas being supplied on
an emergency basis to transportation customers. California gives this gas the lowest priority during a supply
curtailment. In re Rulemaking on the Structure of Gas Util. Procurement Practices and Refinements to the
Regulatory Framework for Gas Util., supra note 45, at 38.
141. These states include Kentucky, Colorado and New Mexico. In re An Investigatin of the Impact
of Fed. Policy on Natural Gas to Ky. Consumers and Suppliers, supra note 81, at 51; In re Rules of the
Pub. Util. Comm'n of Colo. Regulating Gas Transp. Serv., supra note 46, § 2.4(c); NMPSC Rules, supra
note 52, § 660.7(b)(2).
142. Oregon and Pennsylvania allow their LDCs to take non-LDC-owned gas to serve high priority
firm sales customers (such as hospitals). In re Natural Gas Transp. Serv., supra note 55, at 224. In
Pennsylvania, the LDC will pay the gas owner for the gas taken at the LDC's WACOG rate if this. rate is
higher than the owner's cost. 52 PA. CODE § 60.2(11) (1990).
Ohio allows this gas to be taken as necessary to serve residential users, and requires the transportation
customers and their suppliers to continue to ship their gas into the LDC's distribution system for use by
residential customers until the curtailment situation abates. In re Investigation of the Availability of Gas
Transp. Serv. Provided by Ohio Gas Distribution Util. to End-Use Customers, supra note 54, app. A, 9M 2(b),
2(c). The transportation customer need only supply the system with 50% of the volume of gas that the
customer took the preceding month. id. $ 2(c). New York and Wisconsin have vaguely broad provisions
authorizing the LDC to appropriate non-LDC-owned gas in a supply emergency. See, e.g., N.Y. Opinion,
supra note 137, at 12 n.I; In re Natural Gas Distribution Util., supra note 59, at 645.
388
Vol. 9: 355, 1992
Finding Order in the Chaos
gas.'43 It gives him a level of control over his energy source similar to what
he would have if he received energy from a private source delivered by private
transportation.' This is an unnecessary bias in favor of the transportation
customer.'45
5. Obligation to Serve
A public utility traditionally enjoys a monopoly franchise at the price of
accepting an obligation to serve the public. When natural gas is sold com-
petitively, the question arises whether utilities are still obliged to provide gas
to all who ask for it, particularly to those who have previously bought gas from
independent retailers. On one end of the spectrum are those few states that
mandate that LDCs have no obligation to serve transportation customers who
have not purchased standby supply service and now wish to return to the LDCs'
gas supply. 14 6 On the other end is New York, which provides an
unconditional right of transportation customers to return to LDC-owned gas
supply.'47 Several states attempt to prevent such a situation from occurring
by requiring their "human needs" customers 41 to purchase standby service
or have alternative fuel capability.'49 Most states take a stand in the middle
of the spectrum on this issue; they require their LDCs to furnish gas to former
transportation-only customers in certain circumstances and under certain
conditions. 5°
143. This is so unless the LDC charges the customer for the added security of supply.
144. Allowing a transportation customer exclusive control over his supply and, thus, possibly removing
this gas as a source of supply in an emergency, puts greater pressure on the LDC to assure adequate gas
supplies for bundled customers. However, there are better ways to achieve this goal. See, for example,
the discussion of options available to the regulator seeking to improve the efficiency of LDCs' gas
procurement practices in HARUNuzZAMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 45-110.
145. It may be justifiable in a particular case where a customer would otherwise leave the LDC's
system for the security of supply offered by a private transporter.
146. See, e.g., In re Transp. of Natural Gas, supra note 51, at 82; In re Natural Gas Indus. Rates and
Transp. Policies, supra note 57, at 70; In re Natural Gas Transp. Policies, supra note 58, at 468-69.
147. N.Y. Opinion, supra note 137, at 13.
148. "Human needs" customers include residential customers and residential-like cus~lomers, such as
hospitals, prisons, schools, and nursing homes.
149. See, e.g., In re Investigation of the Availability of Gas Transp. Serv. Provided by Ohio Gas
Distribution Util. to End-Use Customers, supra note 54, app. A, T 1(a); In re Natural Gas Distribution Util.,
supra note 59, at 639.
150. Several states require LDCs to supply gas to former transportation-only customers who did not
purchase standby, or sufficient standby, service, but only if the LDC has gas available. Colorado, for
example, requires its LDCs to supply gas, if available, at the applicable sales tariff. In re Rules of the Pub.
Util. Comm'n of Colo. Regulating Gas Transp. Serv., supra note 46, § 2.4(f). Pennsylvania has a rule
declaring there is no duty to provide gas service to such a customer. 52 PA. CODE § 60.5(3) (1990).
However, if gas is available, the LDC "shall" sell it to the desirous customer. In re Regulations Governing
Intrastate Natural Gas Transp. Rates and Serv., supra note 56, at 28.
Some states require LDCs to supply gas if it is available, but with an additional charge or at a higher
rate than otherwise similarly situated sales customers are charged. This charge may or may not be cost-
based, depending on the state. California requires LDCs to provide transportation customers with additional
gas as needed, but allows the LDCs to price the gas at the highest incremental cost of gas for the month
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Taking the position that LDCs have no obligation to serve former trans-
portation customers wishing to return to system supply conflicts with the goal
of an open access policy and achieves nothing that cannot be achieved through
a conditional obligation to serve. The position appears to have been taken in
response to two concerns. First, doing otherwise will impose instability and
unrecoverable costs on an LDC that will have to stand ready to serve
unanticipated loads.' Second, allowing customers to purchase gas from
either an independent retailer or the LDC whenever advantageous is unfair to
traditional customers. This option should be permitted only at a premium.
2
Both of these concerns can be handled in a way that does. not require short-
sighted elimination of the obligation to serve transportation-only customers.
The concern that an LDC will suffer adverse effects by being forced to
stand ready to serve returning customers can be alleviated with a conditional
obligation to serve. The conditions might include a requirement that the
customer give notice of return and pay any incremental costs associated with
his return. The envy that traditional customers might have of customers
enjoying the advantages of a competitive gas retailing market can be dampened,
if not eliminated, by the realization that keeping these customers on the system
is advantageous even to those who find themselves unable to participate in the
competitive gas retailing market.
or 150% of the system WACOG, whichever is higher. In re Rulemaking on the Structure of Gas Util.
Procurement Practices and Refinements to the Regulatory Framework for Gas Util., supra note 45, at 38.
Iowa requires returning customers to pay "a reconnection charge." 250 IOWA ADMIN. CODE § 19.13(4)(c)
(Supp. 1989). There is no discussion of whether such a fee will be cost-based. Kentucky allows its LDCs
to charge a "reasonable re-entry fee." In re An Investigation of the Impact of Fed. Policy on Natural Gas
to Ky. Consumers and Suppliers, supra note 81, at 68. It appears that the fee is to be cost-based. The fee
is to be determined by the Commission on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the "size of the bypasser
and LDC and the LDC's pipeline commitments." Id. Maryland requires the returning gas supply customer
to pay any incremental costs for demand, reservation, or gas supply caused by the return. In re Interstate
Sale and Transp. of Gas, supra note 49, supra note 49, at 11. Oregon requires that the surcharge be designed
to recover the additional costs imposed by the returning customers. In re Natural Gas Transp. Serv., supra
note 55, at 225.
Other states require customers to give advance notice of their intent to return as well as pay all costs
associated with their return. E.g., In re Interstate Sale and Transp. of Gas, supra note 49, ati 0; In re Natural
Gas Distribution Util., supra note 59, at 644. See also New Mexico's policy, discussed infra notes 153-155
and accompanying text.
151. The Virginia Commission's stated that:
[Ilf a customer elects transportation and should not also elect a standby service, the utility
company does not have a continuing public service obligation to sell gas to that customer. Ely
placing the responsibility where it belongs, on the customer to elect what type of service it wants
to take, the gas company can retain some predictability in its requirements, a predictability which
is necessary for it to make its own system plans.
In re Natural Gas Indus. Rates and Transp. Policies, supra note 57, at 70.
152. The Wisconsin Commission explained its rationale in this way: "We consider it reasonable that
a customer who chooses transportation be required to 'take the bitter with the sweet,' the 'sweet' being a
lower commodity cost and the 'bitter' being the inability to float readily back and forth between system
sales and transportation." In re Natural Gas Distribution Util., supra note 59, at 639.
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States that impose no obligation to serve returning customers would, of
course, permit LDCs to serve them. It may seem logical that LDCs would want
to serve these customers whenever possible in order to transport a greater
volume of gas, thereby increasing transportation revenue. However, some LDCs
might not welcome the changes brought by open access and independent gas
retailing. They could easily use the power to deny a return to LDC supply to
discourage initial participation in these markets. Thus, it is unwise to give
LDCs the discretionary power to decide not to serve returning customers.
Requiring certain customers to purchase standby supply service also runs
counter to the goal of open access and hinders the development of an efficient
gas retailing market. Customers, even human needs customers, may be able to
assure themselves of adequate back-up supplies of gas through contractual
arrangements with non-LDC suppliers. Requiring them to purchase standby
from the LDC prohibits the development of the non-LDC supply market. In the
event a customer should have obtained back-up supplies and did not, the utility
can change the customer's behavior by supplying emergency gas at emergency
gas prices. Requiring customers to purchase standby from the LDC may also
provide the decisive, uneconomic disincentive for the customer to decline the
transportation option, contrary to the goal of an open access policy.
Among the conditional approaches to the LDCs' obligation to serve
returning transportation customers, New Mexico's is most consistent with the
goal of open access. New Mexico obliges LDCs to treat returning customers
who give six months notice like new, traditional customers. For example, such
customers are charged for gas only at the WACOG.' 53 If returning customers
give less than six months notice they are not treated like new customers, but
the LDC does incur some obligations on their account. For these customers,
New Mexico's LDCs must use "reasonable efforts" to obtain for them the
lowest cost gas "reasonably available."' 5 4 In return, the LDC charges the
customer the actual cost of that gas if it is higher than the system
WACOG. 55 However, this treatment ends six months after the customer posts
notice of his return.
This approach resolves the regulatory dilemma regarding whether the
.returning customer should be treated like a new customer. It does so by
focussing on those characteristics that distinguish the returning customer from
the new customer and designing the appropriate policy for each.'56 For
153. See NMPSC Rules, supra note 52, § 660.13(d).
154. Id. at § 660.13(e).
155. Id.
156. Compare this approach with Iowa's approach. Although the Iowa Commerce Commission
recognized that length of notice distinguished the new from the returning customer, it did not design its
policy to accommodate this difference. Instead, it merely provided that returning customers shall pay "a
reconnection charge." This opened the Board up to the criticism that it was arbitrarily penalizing the
returning customer even though the new customer might put the same or more demand on the system as
the returning customer. See discussion in In re Natural Gas Distribution Util.; Obligation to Serve and
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example, New Mexico distinguishes a new customer from a returning customer
by the number of days of notice a returning customer must give to trigger the
traditional utility obligation to serve, which is six months in New Mexico.
Thus, a returning customer giving six months notice is treated like a new
customer. However, if the returning customer wishes to be served before the
six month period runs, the Commission imposes a "reasonable efforts"
obligation on the LDC. This rule eliminates the potential that a utility might
engage in strategic behavior and unreasonably attempt to withhold service from
transportation customers in the hopes of thwarting initial participation in the
independent gas retailing market. At the same time, imposing a "reasonable
efforts" standard avoids the possibility that the utility will face unpredictability
and unrecoverable costs by trying to anticipate unexpected loads.
6. Two Approaches to Rate Regulation of Transportation
The states that have unbundled the LDCs' transportation from gas sales
service have followed one of two approaches to determining transportation
rates. The first approach is to set specific, tariffed transportation rates for firm
transportation customers by end use class. These rates are set equal to the
transportation component of the tariffed, bundled rates applicable to traditional
customers of the same class and are designed to recover the LDCs' revenue
requirement (the "determinate rate approach"). The other approach is to allow
the LDC to negotiate a transportation rate for each firm transportation customer
(the "flexible rate approach").
Both approaches are consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of
economic regulation. The first is designed to encourage fair and efficient
competition among sellers of natural gas and thereby displace the lingering,
adverse effects of long-time price regulation of gas. It seeks to prevent that
bypass which can be prevented by delivering gas at the market price. The
second approach attempts to go further. It seeks to prevent as much bypass of
the LDC's system as possible by lowering transportation rates on a case-by-case
basis in order to retain existing customers on the system. Flexible transportation
rates for firm service may be designed to encourage LDCs in competition with
other natural gas pipeline distribution systems to lower their costs. Today,
however, the states use flexible rates to prevent existing customers from turning
to a less costly alternative fuel or conservation measure. Some states also use
flexible rates to lower a customer's cost of doing business so he can remain
in business and remain a customer.
The authority to negotiate transportation rates is a very powerful tool in the
hands of an LDC. It can be misused, intentionally or inadvertently, to frustrate
Transp. Tariffs, supra note 47, at 1-2.
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competition among sellers of natural gas, contrary to the primary goal of
unbundling and open access transportation. In addition, it allows LDCs to give
transportation rate discounts unnecessarily to gas consumers who would remain
on the system without discounts. This adversely affects other customers of the
LDC who will be forced to make up the discount through higher rates if the
LDC is to recover its revenue requirement.1 57 Most states adopting flexible
transportation rates as part of their unbundling policies have done so without
discussion of the pros and cons of giving such power to LDCs. This raises
concern that regulators do not understand the significance of the distinction
between deregulating natural gas prices to encourage gas to become a
competitive commodity and deregulating the prices for the LDCs' transportation
service, which remains a monopoly.
a. The Determinate Rate Approach
Many states adopting open access policies have required LDCs to charge
each customer class a determinate transportation rate equal to the transportation
component formerly applicable to customers of the same class. 58 The
transportation rate is determined in one of two ways. It may be calculated by
subtracting the cost of gas from the rate for traditional, bundled service (often
called the gross-margin approach to setting transportation rates). Alternatively,
it is arrived at by subtracting the cost of gas and gas procurement, from the rate
for traditional, bundled service (the simple-margin approach).' 59 To the extent
the rate for traditional bundled service has allocated a high proportion of
common fixed costs to likely bypass customers, a number of states have
157. Regulators can avoid this problem if they put the LDCs' shareholders at risk for the discounts
or for all the fixed and variable costs associated with serving potential bypassers. See HARUNUZZAMAN
ET AL., supra note 12, at 79-83.
158. See, e.g., 250 IOWA ADMIN. CODE § 19.13 (Supp. 1989); California's final rules for transportation
service setting out five levels of transportation service with associated rates, In re Rulemaking on the
Structure of Gas Util. Procurement Practices and Refinements to the Regulatory Framework for Gas Util.,
supra note 45, at 25; In re Interstate Sale and Transp. of Gas, supra note 49, at 11; In re Intrastate Natural
Gas Transp. Serv., supra note 50, at 51-53; NYPSC Order, supra note 53, at 10-19, 37; In re Natural Gas
Indus. Rates and Transp. Policies, supra note 57, at 67.
159. Consider, for example, Maryland's formula for setting transportation rates:
[Alt this time the initial design of transportation rates should be based upon the LDCs' total retail
sales rates less (a) the commodity cost of gas and (b) the value of any interstate pipeline's
demand-type charge or reservation-type fee which the LDC will no longer have to pay to the
pipeline as a result of the customer switching from the LDCs' sales service to firm or interruptible
transportation.
In re Interstate Sale and Transp. of Gas, supra note 49, at 11.
Massachusetts has adopted a similar formula: "LDCs should file gross-margin-based firm transportation
rates within 45 days of this Order. Such rates would simply be calculated as the existing firm sales rates
less the embedded gas costs." In re Intrastate Natural Gas Transp. Serv., supra note 50, at 52-53.
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expressed their desire to redesign these rates over time. 6 ° They are reluctant
to make the change abruptly because of the potential that utility earnings will
drop and/or core customer rates will rise.'6' Consistent with the cost-based-
rate philosophy, states have sought to add to transportation rates any costs
incurred by LDCs in permitting a customer to decline its gas service, such as
costs incurred under LDCs' take-or-pay gas contracts with their suppliers.'62
As long as distribution of natural gas remains a monopoly, setting a
determinate rate for transportation using traditional cost-of-service ratemaking
principles is consistent with the theory underlying economic regulation of
natural monopolies. Additionally, setting the transportation rate for each
160. Iowa initially adopted an open access policy which anticipated making any changes immediately.
In re Natural Gas Distribution Util.; Obligation to Serve and Transp. Tariffs, supra note 47, at 5 ("All rates
and charges for transportation shall be based on the cost of providing the service."). Also, New York
concluded that its initial rates for firm transportation were "reasonable proxies for the direct costs of firm
transportation service," although it invited interested parties to bring forth better cost of service evidence
in future rate cases. NYPSC Order, supra note 53, at 18-19.
161. Consider, for example, Maryland's explanation:
In future proceedings, the Commission will examine the advisability of adopting transportation
rates based upon cost of service studies which identify the unbundled costs of various types of
services. The transition from margin-based to cost-based transportation rates must be made in
conjunction with appropriate adjustments to sales rates. An orderly transition will insure that all
customers receive more accurate price signals and will minimize rate shock to captive sales
customers.
In re Interstate Sale and Transp. of Gas, supra note 49, at 12.
Although Massachusetts recognized that the gross-margin approach to rates would likely result in the
transportation customer "bear[ing] many costs unrelated to transportation service, such as storage costs and
production costs," and would continue "to perpetuate the disparity in existing class rates of return," it
nevertheless found the approach valuable at least as an interim measure because it would allow transportation
to be implemented immediately "in a manner that should not prove financially disruptive to the LDC, even
if large sales volumes are converted to transportation volumes." In re Intrastate Natural Gas Transp. Serv.,
supra note 50, at 52.
Virginia explained it this way:
We will direct that an embedded cost of service approach to transportation rate design be applied on
a company by company basis for both firm and interruptible transportation service. Over time, the
non-gas margin of the industrial sales rates will be more closely aligned with the transportation rates,
however at the present time we must provide viable competitive options for utilities to offer their
customers. Moreover, since the growth in transportation service is a recent phenomenon, development
of embedded cost of service transportation rates at the present time will not result in rate shock to the
captive customers. An immediate elimination of the subsidy currently being provided by industrial
customers in the retail rates would, however, result in rate shock. We would note, however, that, with
the recent drop in oil prices, the impetus to shift much of the fixed costs of the utility to firm customers
is already in place.
In re Natural Gas Indus. Rates and Transp. Policies, supra note 57, at 67-68.
162. Iowa requires that "[iln order to take transportation without buying standby service, the customer
must buy itself out of any current contract [with the LDC for gas supply]," In re Natural Gas Distribution
Utilities; Obligation to Serve and Transportation Tariffs, No. RMU-86-11 at 2 (Iowa St. Commerce Comm'n
May 30, 1986), and Maryland's position that any pipeline demand-type charge or reservation-type fee
incurred on behalf of the now-transportation customer that the LDC must continue to pay, should remain
in the transportation customer's transportation rate. In re Interstate Sale and Transp. of Gas, supra note 49,
at 12.
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particular class of customers equal to the transportation component of the
traditional rate for that class of customers is consistent with the goal of opening
access to transportation. If the charges differed, each customer would receive
an uneconomic incentive in the direction of one service or another.'63 For
example, if the transportation rate were cheaper than the transportation
component of the traditional rate, the customer would be able to buy gas
actually priced higher than the gas offered by the LDC, but at a lower delivered
price. Though this would be advantageous to the customer, it would erroneously
signal the competitive gas market that the higher gas price was set low enough
to satisfy demand. This result would be contrary to the efficient development
of that market and contrary to the goal of unbundling and open access.
As between the gross- or simple-margin approaches to setting transportation
rates, the latter is better calculated to prevent uneconomic bypass. Indeed, the
simple-margin approach is better for setting the transportation component of
traditional rates as well as setting transportation rates for preventing
uneconomic bypass. To the extent a rate to a potential bypasser is higher than
cost, uneconomic alternatives could be more attractive than they would be if
the potential bypasser were receiving transportation at its actual cost. However,
the decision to move gradually to cost-based rates is a rational one for
regulators to make. 16
b. The Flexible Rate Approach
Many states have unbundled LDCs' services to counter uneconomic bypass
only after exhaustive debate over whether encouraging a competitive gas
retailing market is in the best interest of the public. However, many have gone
on, perhaps unwittingly and certainly with little debate, to embrace a universal
policy of competition by empowering LDCs to negotiate individual
transportation rates to retain load. The negotiating power to LDCs varies among
the states.
In Oregon, the negotiating power is the most circumscribed. Oregon LDCs
are directed to discount transportation rates for customers having the capability
to bum oil so that the delivered price of gas is "competitive with" the delivered
price of oil. 165 In a number of other states, LDCs have the broader power to
163. Robert Means and Deborah Cohn make a similar point. See Means & Cohn, supra note 10, at
561-62.
164. Id. at 560-64.
165. In re Natural Gas Transp. Serv., supra note 55, at 219. However, if the transportation customer
with oil burning capability procures gas from a supplier at a below-market price (defined by the Oregon
Commission as below the market price of oil), then the LDC must discount the transportation rate so that
the customer keeps half of the "savings" he obtained through his gas purchase. Id. at 219-20. Oregon
realized that simply directing the LDC to set a transportation rate for customers with the potential to bum
oil such that the cost of gas delivered was equal to the cost of delivered oil eliminated any incentive the
customer might have had to procure lower cost gas from an independent supplier. Id. at 219.
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negotiate transportation rates "to compete with alternate fuels." '166 In New
Mexico, the power is even more sweeping; LDCs may negotiate transportation
rates "to compete for business."'67  Some states allow their utilities to
negotiate rates without specifying any purpose to be served by the negotiated
rate. 168
Typically, the regulators broadly confine in advance the range within which
rates may be acceptably negotiated. Usually, they require the LDC to file
determinate transportation rates'69 and permit the LDC to adjust these rates
down on a case-by-case basis to a specified minimum. 7 ° Ordinarily, the
minimum is the variable cost of the service provided. 7 . Some states also
permit their LDCs to adjust transportation rates up from the filed rate.' A
ceiling on upward flexibility may be imposed.'73 A few states attempt to curb
166. In re An Investigation of the Impact of Fed. Policy on Natural Gas to Ky. Consumers and
Suppliers, supra note 81, at 52, 54.
167. NMPSC Rules, supra note 52, § 660.8(h).
168. Colorado permits its LDCs to discount transportation rates, but does not specify any purpose to
be achieved with the discount. In re Rules of the Pub. Util. Comm'n of Colo. Regulating Gas Transp. Serv.,
supra note 46, § 4.2. Ohio and Pennsylvania also follow this approach. See In re Investigation of the
Availability of Gas Transp. Serv. Provided by Ohio Gas Distribution Util. to End-Use Customers, supra
note 54, app. A 8; 52 PA. CODE § 60.2 (1990). Wisconsin's guidelines do not limit transportation discount-
ing to customers with alternative fuel capability, although the discussion preceding the guidelines points
out that flexible rates can increase load retention. See In re Natural Gas Distribution Util., supra note 59,
at 642, 645.
169. These states include Kentucky, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
See In re An Investigation of the Impact of Fed. Policy on Natural Gas to Ky. Consumers and Suppliers,
supra note 81, at 52; In re Rules of the Pub. Util. Comm'n of Colo. Regulating Gas Transp. Serv., supra
note 46, § 4.1; NMPSC Rules, supra note 52, § 660.8(b); In re Investigation of the Availability of Gas
Transp. Serv. Provided by Ohio Gas Distribution Util. to End-Use Customers, supra note 54, app. A 8;
52 PA. CODE § 60.2 (1990); W.Va. Transp. Rule, supra note 58, § 3.1, at 466; In re Natural Gas Distribution
Util., supra note 59, at 642, 645.
These rates are determined through the gross-margin method, see discussion supra text accompanying
note 158. or through new cost of service studies. For example, Colorado directs that this rate be "based on
fully allocated cost methods" and include "an allowance for return on allocated rate base equal to the last
rate of return authorized." In re Rules of the Pub. Util. Comm'n of Colo. Regulating Gas Transp. Serv.,
supra note 46, § 4.2(e)(1).
170. See, e.g., In re An Investigation of the Impact of Fed. Policy on Natural Gas to Ky. Consumers
and Suppliers, supra note 81, at 54; NMPSC Rules, supra note 52, § 660.8(h); In re Rules of the Pub. Util.
Comm'n of Colo. Regulating Gas Transp. Serv., supra note 46, § 4.2; In re Investigation of the Availability
of Gas Transp. Serv. Provided by Ohio Gas Distribution Util. to End-Use Customers, supra note 54, app.
A I8.
Pennsylvania declined to set a minimum on the ground that the LDCs would not negotiate a financially
adverse discount. In re Regulations Governing Intrastate Natural Gas Transp. Rates and Serv., supra note
56, at 4-5.
171. However, Colorado reserves the right to tariff the minimum rate at a level it determines "to be
just and reasonable." In re Rules of the Pub. Util. Comm'n of Colo. Regulating Gas Transp. Serv., supra
note 46, § 4.2(a)(1).
172. These states include Kentucky and West Virginia. In re An Investigation of the Impact of Fed.
Policy on Natural Gas to Ky. Consumers and Suppliers, supra note 81, at 54; NMPSC Rules, supra note
81, at 54; W. Va. Transp. Rule, supra note 58, § 3.3(a), at 467. However, West Virginia's regulations
prohibit LDCs from charging more than the tariffed transportation rate to customers transporting gas
produced within West Virginia. W. Va. Transp. Rule, supra note 58, § 3.3(c), at 467.
173. In West Virginia, the determinate benchmark rate is calculated on the basis of fully distributed
costs. The maximum rate up to which transportation rates may flex is the LDC's "otherwise applicable
sales tariff rate excluding the utility's avoidable purchased gas commodity costs." W. Va. Transp. Rule,
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the possibility of unnecessary discounting by establishing a presumption that
any unrecovered fixed costs caused by transportation discounts will not be
obtainable from ratepayers.'74
Regulators who have granted LDCs authority to negotiate firm transpor-
tation rates do so with the hope of retaining load to ensure stable revenue
adequate to cover fixed costs. 175 Discounted transportation rates can be used
to entice gas consumers to forego cheaper energy alternatives or even, in some
states, to forego going out of business.'76 In other words, discounted
transportation rates can be used in an attempt to prevent all, or almost all,
bypass of the LDCs' systems. This goal is different from the primary goal of
unbundling, which is, to prevent bypass of the LDCs' systems caused by solely
delivery of gas priced above the market.
This distinction has several implications. First, the decision whether to
empower LDCs to negotiate transportation rates need not be made in the
context of adopting a policy to govern unbundling and its implementation.'77
The market situation in which a discounted transportation rate is necessary to
retain load, is not one that arises because of unbundling and, therefore, need
not be adopted as part of unbundling reform.'78 Second, the decision whether,
and how, to prevent all LDC bypass should not be made using the same criteria
governing the decision whether, and how, to prevent bypass caused by the
unavailability of market priced gas.' 79 Third, because the perceived urgency
of the threat to the LDC from all bypass is likely to be lessened by reforms
designed to prevent bypass due to the unavailability of market priced gas,
consideration of regulatory change to attempt to prevent all bypass could be
nullified by successful implementation of unbundling. Finally, before the
supra note 58, § 3.3(e)(2)(i), at 467.
174. Pennsylvania's Rule Sec. provides, "There shall be a rebuttable presumption ... that natural gas
supply fixed costs relating to transportation customers should not be recovered from sales customers." In
re Regulations Governing Intrastate Natural Gas Transp. Rates and Serv., supra note 56, at 22. Wisconsin's
guidelines state, "Any revenue shortfall resulting from this discount should be borne by the LDC's
shareholders and not by ratepayers." In re Natural Gas Distribution Util., supra note 59, at 645.
175. For a critique of Ramsey Pricing as used by regulators during the transition from regulated to
deregulated status, see Meyer & Tye, supra note 70, at 280-86. Cf. Pierce, Reconstuting the Industry,
supra note 13, at 49.
176. The LDC may attempt to recover the loss incurred by discounted rates through the use of rates
with high profit margins for customers with less elastic demand.
177. See, e.g., Meyer & Tye, supra note 70. which discusses the problems, including revenue adequacy,
inherent in transition from a regulated to deregulated environment. It analyzes the usual solutions proposed
for the transition, including discriminatory pricing and value of service ratemaking, concluding. that a
regulatory .approach concerned with how the market would have handled the issues presented is often the
best for assuring a successful transition.
178. Means and Cohn argue that any discounted transportation rate should be equally applicable to
the pipeline's sales and transportation customers. See Means & Cohn, supra note 10, at 562-64.
179. For example, it may be that decisionmakers will conclude that the long-term cost of attempting
to prevent all bypass is too great to justify the effort. See, e.g., Johnston & Sullins, supra note 76, T 7, at
173, speculating that continued gas service on some LDC systems to some customers or customer classes
may have been economically feasible when gas was underpriced but may be economically infeasible when
gas rises to market value. In such situations, they suggest, LDCs may have to recognize a loss. id.
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decision is made to grant LDCs rate negotiation power, its likely adverse
impacts on the primary goal of unbundling should be understood.
Giving the LDC authority to negotiate transportation rates can easily
undercut the purposes of unbundling reform. 180 The purpose for making the
LDC's transportation service available independent of its sales service is to
facilitate the development of the incipient competitive market for the sale of
gas in order to get market priced gas to the bumertip. The LDC's ability to
discount transportation rates takes pressure off gas retailers to lower prices to
the market level. Yet it is the gas retailers who are the better parties to be
pressured to lower prices because they operate in the unregulated, competitive
market and cai gain as the market price for gas rises.' If the LDC will cut
its transportation rate, the retailer does not have to lower his gas sales rate as
far to achieve the same delivered price. Indeed, the mere act of endowing the
LDC with authority to negotiate rates exposes it to pressure to discount its
transportation rate. This pressure comes from both from retailers seeking as
high a margin as possible and from consumers seeking as low a cost as
possible. Given that the LDC's access to information to substantiate the
legitimacy of the demands for a transportation discount will always be less than
perfect, 8 2 that the LDC has had little if any previous experience negotiating
a sale in a competitive market, and that the LDC may have little financial
incentive to resist a request for a discount,8 3 the pressure to give discounts,
180. This critique of discounted transportation rates is neither directed at discounted rates for
interruptible transportation nor at discounted rates for transportation of gas outside the intrastate pipeline's
service area which serves a different function for the LDC. See Means & Cohn, supra note 10, at 562.
181. See Means & Angyal, supra note 3, at 44. But see TOMAN, supra note 13, at 6 ("Competition
from alternative fuels also provides a curb on excessive rates; thus, altemative-fuel-based rates are useful
for meeting competition and responding to changing market conditions."). See also Means & Cohn, supra
note 10, at 562 ("Discount transportation rates may also be justified for an identifiable category of
customers, those who would not use the pipeline if the full rate were charged. It is better to obtain some
contribution to fixed costs through a discount rate than to obtain no contribution at all by insisting on the
full transportation tariff.").
182. The fact that the utility will always find it difficult to know whether a transportation discount is,
in fact, warranted was sufficient to cause the Virginia State Corporation Commission to reject the
recommendation that its LDCs be allowed to flex transportation rates:
There are problems, however, associated with flexible transportation rates. The value of trans-
portation to individual customers will vary on the basis of a number of different factors. Unlike
the flexible retail rates, there is not a readily identifiable alternate source of competition to
transportation. Transportation may occur due to any one of a number of factors ranging from
wellhead cost of gas to alternate fuel prices. To respond to these variables, the utility would need
to apply a different rate for each customer and would consequently engage in discriminatory
ratemaking between similarly situated transportation customers. Such a framework would also
result in problems with effective regulatory review problems.
In re Natural Gas Indus. Rates and Transp. Policies, supra note 57, at 67.
183. Only a few states have adopted the policy of holding the LDC's shareholders responsible for
revenues lost by discounting. See supra note 171. Even then, it may be a difficult policy to enforce, and
it raises the question whether shareholders should not also be able to benefit from flexible rates by allowing
the LDC to charge transportation rates above tariffed rates. Another possible approach, not yet adopted by
the states, is to put shareholders at risk for all the fixed costs associated with serving potential bypassers.
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including those unnecessary to retain load, likely will prove too much to
withstand. The threat of a regulatory review disapproving of transportation
discounts may provide some incentive to keep discounts to a minimum, but the
effectiveness of such a review is problematic.8' The regulators will be
hampered by the same lack of information plaguing the LDC in evaluating
whether a discount is necessary.
Allowing an LDC to negotiate transportation rates, but not to negotiate the
transportation component of bundled rates, results in differing treatment of
otherwise similarly situated transportation and traditional customers. This
difference in treatment could easily give rise to incentives- for a customer to
choose bundled over unbundled service or vice versa.
Empowering the LDC to negotiate transportation discounts also increases
concern that the LDC could favor an independent retailer with preferential
access to the transportation system, in this case by charging lower transportation
rates. The danger of this type of anticompetitive behavior will be more acute
if the LDC or its affiliate is an independent retailer of gas. In New Mexico, a
state that allows transportation discounting, this fear led to a requirement that
any discounted rate offered to a purchaser or end user be made available to any
retailer supplying gas to that purchaser or end user.'85
Finally, insulating LDCs from any threat of bypass eliminates the oppor-
tunity for the LDC to respond to the threat by increasing its efficiency and
decreasing its costs.'86 The better course for regulators concerned about
bypass would be to content themselves initially with trying to lower the cost
of the gas by unbundling to foster development of a competitive natural gas
market. The cost of gas comprises, on average, about 76% of the delivered
price. 8 7 Only if that reform fails to eliminate the significant threat of bypass
should regulators assume the risks inherent in empowering LDCs to discount
transportation rates.
III. An Effective Approach to Intrastate Regulatory Reform
Paradigms for post-unbundling regulation of the LDC which-will assure
successful intrastate natural gas regulatory reform can be developed from the
preceding evaluation of the various methods that have evolved in the states. The
resulting models eliminate much of the confusion of existing intrastate
regulation, but are still general enough to accommodate individual state
innovation. Two regulatory models are necessary, one to govern the potential
See supra note 157.
184. See discussion supra note 182.
185. See NMPSC Rules, supra note 52, § 660.8(i). FERC has a similar requirement. See FERC Order
497, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,139 (1988).
186. Cf Broadman & Kalt, supra note 11, at 195.
187. See discussion supra note 31.
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functions of the LDC as independent retailer and one to govern the LDC's
unbundled transportation services.'88
A. Intrastate Regulation of the LDC as Natural Gas Retailer
The analysis above regarding regulation of the LDC as an independent gas
retailer 89 dictates a plan that deters LDCs from engaging in activities having
an anticompetitive effect on the gas retailing market, but otherwise eschews
regulation of the LDC as independent gas retailer. 9° The heart of the plan
would be a provision either forbidding the LDC from becoming, or from
creating a corporate affiliate to become, an independent gas retailer 9' or
permitting the LDC to participate in the market through an unregulated
affiliate,'92 but strictly proscribing the LDC's interactions with its marketing
affiliate to prevent the LDC from giving its affiliate an advantage not given to
other independent retailers.'93
Either of these approaches to the LDC's possible participation in the
unbundled gas retailing market is likely to achieve the goal of unbundling.'94
If the LDC is permitted to participate in this market, it is better to require it
to do so through an affiliate rather than through an unregulated arm of the
LDC. Formation of an affiliate eliminates the upstream interstate capacity
advantage the LDC would otherwise have over non-LDC marketers.'95
Further, many believe this corporate separation makes it easier for regulators
to monitor the LDC's dealings with its marketing arm.'96 Whether or not the
LDC is allowed to participate in the independent gas retailing market through
an affiliate, regulatory prohibitions should be enacted to preclude the LDC from
giving any preference under the regulated distribution system to any
independent retailer.'97 Prohibiting the LDC from giving an advantage to a
188. See discussion supra Part [I(A)(l) (explaining that the LDC's post-unbundling transportation-only
and gas-only services have different characteristics which demand different regulatory treatments). In
addition, the LDC will continue to provide the traditional bundled service governed by traditional regulation,
which is not discussed here.
189. See discussion supra Part I(B).
190. See supra Part I](B)(2) (discussing how monopoly-like regulation of LDC when it operates in
otherwise potentially competitive unbundled gas retailing market is antithetical to traditional regulatory
theory and is contrary to the goals of unbundling).
191. This is the prohibitory approach to regulation of the LDC as gas retailer. See discussion supra
Part 1](B)(3).
192. This is one of the variations of the hands-off approach to regulation of the LDC as independent
gas retailer. See discussion supra Part II(B)(1).
193. See discussion supra note 88 and accompanying text.
194. See discussion supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
195. See discussion supra note 90 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., 53 Fed. Reg. 22,140-42 (1988) (discussion of comments received by FERC in response
to proposed rule issued in Inquiry into Alleged Anticompetitive Practices Related to Marketing Affiliates
of Interstate Pipelines).
197. See discussion supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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particular independent retailer develops a fair and competitive gas retailing mar-
ket, which is the goal of unbundling.
B. Intrastate Regulation of the LDC as Gas Transporter
The six issues central to a transportation access plan are whether LDCs
must, or may, offer unbundled transportation; which customers will be eligible
for unbundled transportation service; which aspects of transportation will be
unbundled; what the status of transportation-only customers will be in the event
of curtailments; whether the LDC will have a utility-like obligation to serve
transportation-only customers who desire to switch back to prepackaged
transportation and gas service; and how transportation rates will be
regulated. 98
The above analysis regarding the first aspect of a transportation access plan,
whether regulators should require or merely permit LDCs to offer unbundled
transportation service in addition to traditional prepackaged utility services,
leads to the conclusion that states wanting a competitive gas retailing market
to prevent uneconomic bypass must mandate, not just authorize,
unbundling.'99 Giving LDCs the discretion to choose unbundling leaves them
free to reject it even when it is in their own, and the public's, short-term or
long-term best interest.2" For example, they might refrain from offering
separate transportation service out of fear that the administrative cost is too
high. The better solution would be simply to include the administrative cost in
the price of the service. Those who believe it is an acceptable cost will
willingly and happily pay for the service.
The above analysis regarding the second aspect of a transportation access
policy, that is, whether any customer wishing to use transportation-only service
should be able to do so or whether the availability of the service should be
restricted to customers with particular characteristics, leads to the conclusion
that all customers should be eligible for unbundled transportation service.""
To the extent certain types or classes of customers impose a particular cost on
the LDC not imposed by other customers, the cost should be added to the price
of the transportation made available to them.2"2 In this manner, those
customers can decide for themselves whether choosing the transportation option
198. See discussion supra Part II(C).
199. See discussion supra Part [1(C)( 1 )(a) (examining states' experiences with voluntary and mandatory
unbundling).
200. Robert Johnston and David Sullins argue that it is important for public utility commissions to be
involved in the LDC's decision whether to use non-pipeline gas brokers to supply the LDC gas before, not
after, the decision is made. See Johnston & Sullins, supra note 76, at 174.
201. See discussion supra Part I](C)(l)(b).
202. For example, the concern raised in some states is that transporting "small volumes" of gas will
impose an unacceptable cost on the LDC. See discussion supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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is economically wise. To the extent the regulator is concerned that certain types
or classes of customers might unwisely choose transportation-only over
prepackaged service, the regulator should devise a safety net program and
charge customers who use it, rather than enact a blanket proscription against
the potential participation of these customers in the market. 3
The above analysis regarding the third aspect of a transportation access
policy, the extent to which states should unbundle the subservices traditionally
provided as part of gas transportation and sales service, leads to the conclusion
that utilities should separately offer as many subservices as demanded.
2°4
These subservices potentially include firm.. transportation, interruptible
transportation, off-peak transportation, rights to upstream pipeline capacity, gas
processing, gas gathering, gas storage, load balancing, standby sales service,
and emergency sales service. Separately offering and pricing these services is
necessary to ensure that traditional LDC customers decide whether to use a
non-LDC gas retailer solely on the basis of differences related to gas cost and
service. If a subservice that a traditional LDC customer has been using and
wants to continue using remains bundled up with the LDC's sales service, then
the traditional customer will not be able to avail himself of the opportunity to
use an independent gas retailer. This leaves the customer susceptible to
uneconomic bypass. For example, if the customer has been using interruptible
transportation as a traditional LDC customer, but cannot get that service if he
uses an independent gas supplier, he has an uneconomic incentive to remain
an unsatisfied gas sales customer of the LDC or to leave the LDC's system.
Another potential problem of leaving subservices bundled up with the
LDC's gas transportation service is that the customer using an independent gas
supplier might have to pay twice for a gas sales subservice.205 He might have
to pay his independent retailer for a subservice the retailer actually provides
him, while still paying the LDC for the same service, which the LDC does not
provide him, because it is part of the LDC's transportation rate. The presence
of this double charge gives the customer an uneconomic incentive to leave the
LDC's system. It also provides an uneconomic incentive for customers to
remain on the LDC's gas supply, contrary to the goal of developing a fair and
efficient gas sales market and adverse to the long term health of the LDC and
its traditional customers.2°6
The above analysis regarding the fourth aspect of a transportation access
plan, the status of the customer using non-LDC supplied gas in the event of
curtailment, leads to the conclusion that all the LDC's customers, traditional
203. See discussion supra note 115 and accompanying text.
204. See discussion supra Part H(C)(3).
205. An example of how this could occur is described above. See supra note 131 and accompanying
text.
206. See supra Part 1](C)(3) (noting two incidental benefits of full unbundling of subservices for gas
producers and independent retailers).
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and transportation-only customers, should be treated the same in the event of
curtailment. 2 7 If customers not using the LDC's gas supply are given an
inferior curtailment status, they will have an uneconomic incentive to remain
on the LDC's gas supply and remain susceptible to uneconomic bypass.208
The above analysis regarding the fifth aspect of a transportation access plan,
whether an LDC has an obligation to serve a customer who wishes to switch
from a non-LDC gas supply to the LDC's gas supply, leads to the conclusion
that regulators must impose an obligation on the LDC to serve returning gas
customers equivalent to the obligation imposed on the LDC to serve new gas
customers of the same class.0 9 If the LDC has no obligation to serve new
industrial customers,21 then it likewise should have no obligation to serve
returning industrial customers. If, however, returning customers are treated more
onerously than new customers, returning customers are uneconomically deterred
from buying non-LDC supplied gas initially. Therefore, they have an
uneconomic incentive to leave the LDC's system. It might seem unnecessary
to impose such an obligation to serve on the LDC because it appears to be in
the LDC's best interest to serve a returning customer if the LDC possibly can.
Nevertheless, the obligation should be imposed to foreclose the possibility that
a LDC resistant to an open access policy refuses to serve returning customers
in order to discourage them from initially participating in open access.
The above analysis regarding the sixth aspect of an open access plan, how
transportation rates will be regulated, leads to several conclusions. First, the
approach to setting transportation rates should be the same for unbundled and
bundled customers alike. For example, if unbundled transportation rates for
certain customer classes can be negotiated with the LDC, the transportation
component of bundled rates for those customer classes also should be
negotiable. Rates for unbundled transportation services should be cost-based,
and the rate should include the administrative costs of offering unbundled
services. It is better to include this cost in the rate and let potential users of the
unbundled service decide whether it is to their advantage to unbundle, rather
than let the administrators try to decide in advance what customers will be
willing to pay.
If unbundling successfully results in the availability of market priced natural
gas and if regulators design cost-based transportation rates2"' discounted
207. See discussion supra Part II(C)(4).
208. Some states give these customers a better curtailment status in the event of a supply, but not
transportation, curtailment. The effect of this is evaluated in supra Part LI(C)(4).
209. See discussion supra Part H(C)(5).
210. In California, for example, LDCs only have an obligation to provide a non-core customer with
gas if the customer enters into a two-year commitment to take-or-pay for 75% of the volume nominated.
In re Rulemaking on the Structure of Gas Util. Procurement Practices and Refinements to the Regulatory
Framework for Gas Util., supra note 45, at 10.
211. See supra note 17 (discussing complexity of this endeavor).
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transportation rates may not be necessary to prevent most LDC bypass.
Therefore, the decision whether to give LDCs the authority to negotiate rates
should be made independently of the decision whether to open access to the
LDCs' distribution systems and should be delayed until the other regulatory
reforms have a chance to impact the industry. If regulators pursue the goal of
preventing all, or almost all, LDC bypass by empowering LDCs to negotiate
transportation rates for potential bypassers, regulators are likely to undercut the
benefits that should accrue from unbundling. First, transportation discounting
threatens the competitiveness of the gas retailing market because it has the
potential to take the pressure off gas retailers to sell gas at. competitive rates.
Second, unless transportation rate discounts are similarly available to bundled
customers, a customer may have an uneconomic incentive to choose bundled
or unbundled service. Third, LDCs may not have the incentive or information
to give only necessary discounts.212 Finally, authority to negotiate rates can
be preferentially exercised to favor particular gas retailers, also contributing to
decreased competition in the gas retailing market.
Conclusion
A set of working principles to guide resolution of the regulatory issues
presented by unbundling can be distilled from the preceding analyses. These
principles are broad enough to allow states to adopt innovative reforms, but
sufficiently narrow to restrict the reforms to those consistent with the regulatory
theory underlying the changes, and most likely to achieve the goals of reform.
They include:
1. The regulatory policy governing the LDC as an independent gas retailer
should be developed separately from that governing the LDC as a gas
transporter. Although the ultimate aim of both these policies is to develop a
fair and efficient market for the sale of gas, the different characteristics of the
LDC's unbundled gas retailing service and its transportation service demand
different regulatory schemes.
2. Regulation of the LDC as an independent gas retailer should be
designed to implement a fair, competitive gas retailing market. Several
corollaries follow from this proposition:
a. The focus of regulating the LDC as an independent gas retailer
should be to prevent it from engaging in activities having an anticompetitive
effect on the gas retailing market. Creating a competitive gas retailing market
demands the participation of as many retailers as possible. New entrants can
212. See discussion supra note 183 (arguing that this adverse impact could be ameliorated by putting
shareholders at risk for the discounts or for all the fixed costs associated with serving potential bypassers).
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be encouraged only if no retailers have any special advantage arising from past
or present regulation of the distribution system.
b. If the LDC is allowed to participate in the independent gas retailing
market, its activities in that arena should not be subjected to utility-like
regulation. The point of unbundling is to establish a competitive gas retailing
market. If the regulator permits the LDC to operate in one corporate form or
another in this market, it is counterproductive to subject these operations of the
LDC to monopoly-like rate regulation. Rate regulation hinders the LDC's ability
to acquire gas supplies responsive to end users' needs and hinders the
development of a fair and competitive gas retailing market.
3. Regulation of the LDC as gas transporter should be designed to assure
access to the distribution pipeline in a way that implements a competitive gas
retailing market. Several corollaries follow from this proposition:
a. Access to the distribution system should be arranged so that the end
user chooses one potential gas supplier over another, including the LDC as
traditional gas supplier, solely because of differences related to gas cost and
service. In other words, the terms and conditions for using the LDC's
transportation service should be the same for any customer regardless of from
whom he chooses to purchase his gas, including from the LDC as traditional
gas supplier.2"3 If the transportation customer is treated one way if he chooses
traditional prepackaged service and another way if he chooses to purchase his
gas from an independent retailer, he will have an uneconomic incentive to
choose one over the other. This would unnecessarily retard the development
of a fair and efficient gas market.
b. Regulators should refrain from precluding the availability of
unbundled transportation options out of concern that the cost to the LDC to
do so is too high; instead, price the option to include this cost and let the
consumer decide whether it is too high to use. This approach ensures that the
regulator does not unnecessarily foreclose the gas retailing market to a willing
participant.
c. Regulators should refrain from delegating the discretion to make
unbundling decisions to the LDC, although it may know its financial incentives
better than the regulator. Even if the LDC knows better than the regulator
where its financial best interest lies under an unbundling regime, and even if
this interest is always coincident with the goal of developing the competitive
gas market, there is no guarantee, at least in the short-term, that the LDC will
choose the option that maximizes this interest. The LDC may instead engage
213. This mirrors the principle enunciated by the U.S. House Republican Research Committee's Task
Force on Energy and Natural Resources in their report on contract carriage for interstate pipeline regulation.
See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 14 ("All customers of a pipeline system should be treated on
an equal footing: new contract carriage customers should be treated the same as new sales customers").
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in strategic behavior designed to stymie the implementation of unbundling
reform.
Adoption of policies consistent with these principles, taking into account
the individual circumstances in each state, is just the beginning of the regulatory
reform necessary to bring market priced natural gas to consumers. In time, these
policies will help the gas market make the transition from a pervasively
regulated monopsony to a more competitive market. As competition in the sale
of gas increases, certain policies may profitably be adjusted. 14 For example,
non-LDCs may come to offer extensive standby services, and regulators will
not have to require LDCs to do so. Federal regulatory change may also trigger
responsive intrastate regulatory action.2"5 All future reform will be most
effective if it is consistent with the monopolistic or competitive characteristics
of the underlying markets.
214. See, e.g., Curtis A. Cramer, Intrastate Natural Gas Regulation: Developments to Come, 2-3 (Feb.
1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that growth of competition eliminates public
utility's responsibility for service reliability).
215. See id. at 3-4 (discussing possible federal triggering actions).
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